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SUMMARY 
 
Since the early 1990s, India has undergone substantial economic policy reform 
and economic growth. Though reforms in agricultural policy have lagged those in other 
sectors, they have nonetheless created a somewhat more open economic orientation. In 
this study, we evaluate the protection and support versus disprotection of agriculture in 
India. Our methodology involves examining market price support (MPS) for eleven 
crops, the expenditures on input subsidies benefiting farmers (for fertilizer, electricity and 
irrigation), and product-specific and total producer support estimates (PSEs) over the 
period 1985-2002. We draw on the extensive price-comparison and subsidy-measurement 
data sets and analysis developed earlier by Gulati and his co-authors, often using 
disaggregated analysis for representative surplus and deficit states. This allows us to 
explore how key cost adjustments impact the results.   
Overall, our results indicate that support for agriculture in India has been counter-
cyclical. Support for agriculture has been rising when world prices are low (as in the mid 
1980s and 1998-2002) and falling when world prices are high (as in the early and mid 
1990s). Our results demonstrate the increased importance of budgetary payments for 
input subsidies in agriculture in recent years. Yet, in the aggregate for both price support 
and budgetary expenditures over the period 1985-2002 the counter-cyclical dimension of 
agricultural policy dominates a clear trend of movement from disprotection towards 
protection. 
Using different variants of MPS and PSE measurment we have extended earlier 
analysis to demonstrate the impact of key assumptions on the calculations. These 
assumptions we argue are important to consider. For example, in the standard approach, 
the MPS for the covered commodities is “scaled up” based on the share of the covered 
commodities in the total value of production. If the commodity coverage is less than 
complete, as is often the case, the scaling up procedure leads to a total MPS of greater 
absolute value than the MPS for the covered commodities. This can result in PSEs of 
different sign than the non-scaled up version but is inappropriate unless market price 
support for the commodities not covered is similar to that of the covered commodities.  
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Furthermore, we find that the standard procedure of computing the MPS through 
a comparison of the domestic price to an adjusted reference price based on observed 
imports or exports can be problematic. This happens when trade volumes are relatively 
small. In such a scenario a reference price based on observed imports or exports can lead 
to misleading conclusions. To address the reference price issue, we follow Byerlee and 
Morris (1993). Essentially the approach adopted is to compute the level of protection or 
disprotection based on a counterfactual reference price chosen on economic criteria i.e. 
the adjusted reference price that would exist in the country if the policy interventions 
were removed. The relevant price can either be the autarky equilibrium price or the 
import or export adjusted reference price depending on the relationship among these 
prices. We apply this modified procedure for six crops (wheat, rice, corn, sorghum, sugar 
and groundnuts). The choice of the crops is dictated by the fact that India has been near 
self-sufficiency and there have been changes in the direction of trade over the period of 
analysis.  
The magnitudes of estimated support for agriculture obtained in this paper are 
important for several reasons. The estimates confirm that high levels of subsidies were 
required for India to export wheat or rice in recent years, a conclusion reached by several 
other studies. However, we report less disprotection of Indian agriculture in the 1990s 
than in earlier studies. Partly this difference is explained by the modified procedure for 
choice of a reference price. A large component of this difference can be accounted for by 
whether or not the scaling up procedure is invoked.  
There are also fertile areas for future research. Estimates of adjustment costs used 
in domestic-to-border price comparisons, such as transportation and processing costs or 
marketing margins, are crucial variables in the analysis and merit being re-examined and 
further updated. Resolving what are the most reasonable assumptions about reference 
prices, or extending the analysis to additional crops and livestock to reduce uncertainty in 
future assessments will also contribute to fuller understanding of the net stance of policy 
toward agriculture and how it has evolved over time.  iv 
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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN INDIA:  
PRODUCER SUPPORT ESTIMATES 1985-2002 
 




Governments intervene in agricultural markets with trade and domestic support 
policies in developed as well as in developing countries though the nature and the degree 
of distortions differ substantially. The support to agriculture in developed countries came 
under sharp focus under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and due to the work by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The work by OECD reported high market price 
support (MPS) and producer support estimates (PSEs) for the developed and some 
emerging transition economies. There are however few such estimates available about 
support provided by the developing countries especially post Uruguay round.   
In a seminal work, Schiff and Valdes (1992) studied agricultural policy distortions 
in 18 developing countries over the period 1960-1985. Their findings, based on a partial 
equilibrium framework, revealed that developing countries had inflicted substantial 
implicit taxation on their agricultural sectors through their restrictive trade, pricing and 
exchange rate policies. The implication was that the policies of developing countries had 
restricted the growth rates of agriculture. The effect of removing these distortions was 
estimated to be substantial. In particular, the growth rates in agriculture in the developing 
countries was expected to double if the distortions were removed (Schiff and Valdes, 
1992).  
Since the mid 1980s, much of the developing world has undertaken major policy 
reforms affecting agricultural pricing and exchange rates. Moreover, URAA has enforced 
                                                 
1 The authors are, respectively, former Senior Research Assistant, Senior Research Fellow 
(d.orden@cgiar.org), and Director (a.gulati@cgiar.org) in the Markets, Trade and Institutions Division, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (MTID/IFPRI), Washington, D.C.  
2 
several disciplines on the agricultural trade policies in the developing countries. With 
rising membership of the developing countries in the WTO, including such large 
economies as India and China, it is becoming increasingly important to know the 
structure of farm support or taxation in these countries. The importance of such 
assessments is exemplified by the highly confrontational views on the agricultural 
policies of developing and developed countries that has complicated progress in the 
ongoing Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations launched in 2001.   
This study on India is a part of a larger project to compute PSEs in agriculture for 
selected Asian developing countries, using a common approach. We draw on the OECD’s 
approach to the measurement but make important modifications to apply in case of a 
developing country.
2  In the context of India, an issue that has dominated the discussions 
is whether agriculture as a whole has gone from being taxed to being subsidized. Input 
subsidies in the 1990s have risen to a hefty 8.5 percent of agricultural GDP. Indian grain 
surpluses have also burgeoned in recent years (2001-2002). When world prices of farm 
commodities fell during 1998-2002, in part due to farm subsidy and protection policies 
worldwide, India found it difficult to export some crops without subsidies.   
In our analysis, MPS and PSEs have been computed from 1985 to 2002 for 11 
commodities: cereals (wheat (through 2003), rice, corn, and sorghum), sugar, oilseeds 
(groundnut, rapeseed, soybean, and sunflower), pulses (chickpeas), and cotton. These 
crops accounted for an average of 45 percent of the total value of agricultural production 
in India during 1985-2002. We find that the level of protection or disprotection has a 
counter-cyclical characteristic for specific crops and in the aggregate. The total PSE is 
positive when world prices are low (as in the late 1980s and 1990s) and negative when 
world prices are high (as in the mid 1990s). We also find significant variations in the 
magnitude of protection or disprotection across commodities and for each commodity 
over time.   
                                                 
2 Related papers are Mullen et al. (2004), Thomas and Orden (2004), Hoa and Grote (2004), and Cheng and 
Orden (2004).    
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief 
overview of the general economic situation in India since the mid-1980s and describe the 
place of the agricultural sector. We also review India’s international trade and domestic 
policy regimes for agriculture with reference to URAA commitments. In Section 3 we 
describe our approach to PSE measurement and in Section 4 we review past studies of 
agricultural protection in India. In Sections 5 and 6 we discuss product-specific MPS and 
PSE results and present some discussion of the dairy and poultry sectors. Sections 7 and 8 
present our estimates of the total PSE for India and a summary and conclusions, 
respectively.     
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2.  ECONOMIC AND POLICY BACKGROUND 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
In recent decades economic growth and living standards have improved in India.  
Many social indicators demonstrate improvements, such as lower levels of poverty and 
increased levels of education. India’s per capita GDP has doubled over the last two 
decades. The middle class with annual incomes of more than $13,750 adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (PPP) includes over 15 percent of the population and is the 
fastest growing income group (Landes and Gulati, 2003).
3 The percentage of the 
population living in urban areas has increased from 23 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 
2001, and is projected to reach 41 percent by 2030 (Pingali and Khwaja, 2004). The 
proportion of people living on less than $1 per day decreased from 46 percent in the early 
1990s to 35 percent in 2002. Yet, progress in other areas, such as increasing employment 
in rural areas, has been slow (World Bank, 2003a). Thirty percent of the rural population, 
and 25 percent of the urban population lives below the poverty line (World Bank, 2003b). 
Aggregate indicators at the all-India level mask regional inequalities, with poverty 
particularly acute in the heavily populated northern and eastern states (World Bank, 
2003a).   
India’s GDP grew more strongly in the 1980s than during the 1970s (see Figure 
1). GDP has subsequently registered impressive growth in the 1990s after an economic 
crisis in 1991 stimulated significant economic reforms.
4 During the height of the 
economic crisis in 1991, India’s holdings of foreign reserves fell to about $1 billion, 
equal to the value of just two weeks of imports (Joshi and Little, 1995). Following the 
crisis, India launched reforms that included reductions in the central government fiscal 
deficit, substantial liberalization and deregulation of the industrial sector, trade policy 
                                                 
3 Throughout this report, figures in dollars ($) refer to U.S. currency. 
4 Some contend that the 1980s growth, depending on how one defines the “1980s” and “1990s,” was on 
average higher, although more variable, than during the 1990s, but also unsustainable (Panagariya, 2004; 
Ahluwalia, 2002). Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) attribute the pick-up in the economy in the 1980s, a full 
decade before the 1991 reforms, to an attitudinal shift in the national government in favor of private 
business.  
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reforms, devaluation and floating of the rupee, reforms of the tax system, and measures to 
strengthen and to improve monitoring of the financial system (Ahluwalia, 2002). 
Subsequently, in the period 1992-93 to 1996-97, GDP grew at a rate of 7.1 percent. In 
1997-98 to 2003-04, GDP grew at 5.5 percent, a slight slowdown from the period 
immediately following reforms brought on, among other factors, by a slowdown in public 
sector investments, falling world prices of most agricultural products, and the poor 
monsoon rains, especially in 2002-03.  
Despite the past two decades of growth, India has lagged some of its neighbors in 
economic performance. India’s per capita GDP was roughly equal to that of China and 
Indonesia in 1970 ($213 in real 1995 value). By 2000, its per capita GDP ($477 real 1995 
value) was less than half that achieved by China ($878) and Indonesia ($1,034) (World 
Bank, 2003a). Indian exports during the decade of the 1990s grew at an annual rate of 
10.1 percent, compared to 7.4 percent during the 1980s (Joshi et al., 2003). Yet, despite 
India’s increasing integration into the global economy, it ranks 61st out of 62 countries, 
ahead of only Iran, in the 2004 A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index 
(Foreign Policy, 2004).
5 
Although agriculture benefited indirectly from the exchange rate devaluation and 
liberalization of the industrial sector, direct reforms in the agriculture sector following the 
1991 crisis were notably absent (Pursell and Gulati, 1995). Agriculture grew more slowly 
than the other sectors both in the decades before and after the 1991 reforms, leading to a 
significant change in the structure of the economy (Figure 1). Between 1980 and 2003, 
agriculture declined from 38 percent to 22 percent of total GDP (Government of India 
(GOI), 2004).  Following reforms, growth has been strongest in the services sector, yet 
agriculture still employs nearly sixty percent of the total work force (World Bank, 
2003b).  
 
                                                 
5 The Globalization Index is based on 14 variables grouped into four categories: economic integration, 
technology, political engagement and personal contact.  
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Figure 1—Real Growth of GDP and GDP of Agriculture and Allied Activities at 








































































































































































































































Note:  Growth rates are logarithmic trends. The average growth rates GDP and GDP of Agriculture and 
Allied Activities from 1992-93 to 2003-04 are 6.1% and 2.5%, respectively.  
 Source: GOI, 2004 
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2.2  A CHANGING AGRICULTURAL SECTOR   
Traditional crops and livestock products remain dominant in Indian agriculture, 
but the output mix is changing rapidly. Table 1 gives levels of production of India’s top 
ten agricultural products in 2003 (ranked by value of production at international 
commodity prices). For eight of the ten products, India is also the first or second largest 
producer in the world. It ranks lower only for indigenous cattle meat (ninth in the world) 
and cotton lint (third in the world).  




Rank in World  Product  Production (MT) 
1  2  Rice, Paddy  132,013,000
2  1  Buffalo Milk  47,850,000
3  2  Wheat  65,129,300
4  2  Cow Milk, Whole, Fresh  36,500,000
5  2  Vegetables Fresh nes  37,000,000
6  2  Sugar Cane  289,630,016
7  2  Groundnuts in Shell  7,500,000
8  1  Chick-Peas  4,130,000
9  9  Indigenous Cattle Meat  1,489,929
10  3  Cotton Lint  2,100,000
 
Note: Ranked in terms of value of production at international commodity prices. 
Source: FAO (2004). 
 
While the growth rates for the entire agricultural sector has been relatively 
constant in the 1980s and 1990s, the composition of the production mix has changed in 
favor of high-value commodities (Joshi and Gulati, 2003). During the 1990s, high-value 
agriculture, defined as fruits and vegetables, dairy, poultry, eggs, meat and fishery, grew 
by more than double the rate registered by the cereal sector. The growth rates measured 
as the value of output (as distinct from that of agricultural GDP) for fruits and vegetable, 
in particular, increased at a rate of over six percent per year during the 1990s (Figure 2). 
Thus, Indian agriculture is undergoing a significant structural transformation from a  
8 
cereal led growth to high-value led growth, which is being driven by increased domestic 
and export demand for non-cereals and improved supply capacity for the high-value 
products.  
Within India, rising incomes, urbanization, changing relative prices of cereals and 
non-cereal foods, are leading to diet diversification away from cereals and towards high-
value agriculture. Preferences are shifting toward high-value products at all income 
levels. Growth in demand for staple foods, such as wheat, rice, and coarse grains, which 
have been the focus of agricultural development policy, institutions and public spending, 
has slowed (Landes and Gulati, 2003). By contrast, demand for other foods, including 
fruits, vegetables, fats, and livestock products are now showing relatively high, even 
accelerating, growth (Figure 3).    
The exports of agricultural commodities during the 1990s grew at an annual rate 
of 8.1 percent, compared to an annual rate of 3.3 percent during the 1980s. Although the 
share of agriculture in total exports declined from 24 percent during the 1980s to 18 
percent in the 1990s, the diversification in agricultural production has promoted exports 
of many non-traditional items. Historically, there were virtually no exports of fruits and 
vegetables or livestock and fish products. The export shipments of these commodities 
more than doubled during the 1990s (Figure 4). However, compared to countries such as 
China, India has not experienced as much of a shift in the composition of exports from 
land-intensive bulk commodities to labor-intensive products that might be competitive in 
a smallholder dominated agricultural system. In India’s top export products, the 
traditional commodities are still dominant with the exception of fish that has reached a 
value as high as the 10
th-ranked agricultural exports of castor bean oil (see Figure 4 and 
Table 2). Overall, exports of basic agricultural commodities in 2002 were only a small 
proportion of domestic production (for example, negligible amounts of rice or buffalo 
meat, but 5.6 percent of wheat, among the top ten commodities in production and 
exports). 
Agricultural imports make up a relatively small portion of total merchandise 
trade. In the period 1996/97 to 1999/2000, agriculture accounted for 4 to 7 percent of  
9 
merchandise imports (WTO, 2002). Palm oil and soybean oil are India’s top agricultural 
imports, and India is also the world’s largest importer of these products (Table 3). In 
recent years edible oil imports have accounted for over 50 percent of the total value of 
India’s agricultural imports. Cashew nuts, the 3rd
 ranked import, account for about ten 
percent of the total agricultural import value.    
 





























































Source: Landes and Gulati (2003) 
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Note: TE is triennium ending. 
Source: Joshi and Gulati (2003). 
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Unit Value  
(US$) 
1  2  Milled Paddy Rice  4,968,813 1,202,408 242
2  1  Cáshew Nuts Shelled  122,064 396,790 3,251
3  10  Wheat  3,671,254 361,917 99
4  3  Tea  181,617 326,629 1,798
5  5  Sugar Refined  1,469,875 322,235 219
6  7  Cake of Soya Beans  1,440,805 274,796 191
7  1  Buffalo Meat  292,163 263,703 903
8  11  Tobacco Leaves  101,164 151,844 1,501
9  12  Coffee, Green  164,689 142,590 866
10  1  Oil of Castor Beans  143,643 100,979 703
 
Note: Ranked in terms of value of trade at international commodity prices. 















1  1  Oil of Palm  3,052,625 1,211,810 397
2  1  Oil of Soya Beans  1,196,535 540,146 451
3  1  Cashew Nuts  402,982 254,233 631
4  7  Cotton Lint  230,801 252,985 1,096
5  1  Pulses nes  761,310 242,326 318
6  1  Peas, Dry  869,803 197,979 228
7  1  Silk, Raw and Waste  9,054 133,087 14,699
8  5  Fatty Acids Oils  272,481 90,826 333
9  5  Wool, Greasy  28,675 86,658 3,022
10  4  Wool, Scoured  44,983 78,238 1,739
 
Note: Ranked in terms of value of trade at international commodity prices.  
Source: FAO (2004). 
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2.3  AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
6  
Indian agricultural policy has long been characterized by border and domestic 
interventions aimed at protecting farmers from international price volatility. To achieve 
this goal the Government of India (GOI) has at various times implemented myriad 
policies including tariffs, quantitative import restrictions (QRs), import licensing, 
domestic marketing controls, and export restrictions. These controls have been 
implemented with a view toward the balance of domestic demand and supply, export 
potential, and the national balance-of-payment situation (WTO, 2002). There were 
sweeping reforms in exchange rate policies and a marked decline in industrial protection 
in 1991, but it was not until later in the decade that direct reforms began in agriculture. 
Agricultural reforms started at the border, with the opening up of rice exports in 1994. In 
comparison, the reforms in the arena of domestic policy have been slow. These reforms 
have been to a large extent a consequence of unilateral policy initiatives rather than the 
results of reduction commitments required under the WTO (Hoda and Gulati, 2005). 
2.4 TRADE  POLICIES 
The economic reforms introduced in 1991 initiated a partial liberalization of 
India’s trade regime, mainly because the progress in phasing out QRs on consumer 
products, including agricultural products, was slow. Except for the liberalization of 
import licensing on sugar and cotton in 1994, the same year that exports of rice were 
opened up, most agricultural products remained subject to import controls. India’s import 
policy reform did not begin in earnest until the abolition of QRs was required under the 
WTO in 2001. Export controls in agriculture were also slow to be removed. 
2.4.1 Import  Policy 
The most important import policy features to occur are removal of QRs and the 
binding of tariffs at high rates. In 1997, with considerable improvement in its post-crisis 
                                                 
6 This section draws heavily on Hoda and Gulati (2005).  
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balance-of-payments situation, India agreed to phase out its QRs over a nine-year period. 
Under a dispute settlement ruling by the WTO Appellate Body, India then had to 
accelerate lifting these measures to April 2001.
7 To alley fears of a surge in imports when 
the QRs were abolished, the GOI trade policy (GOI, 2001d) provided for a ministerial-
level standing group that was to function as a “war-room” tracking and analyzing 
information about imports of 300 sensitive items, of which over two-thirds were 
agricultural products. The GOI also explored options that would permit the imposition of 
temporary QRs to stem any import surges. Removal of QRs increased attention to 
enforcement of existing legislation concerning bio-security and sanitary and 
phytosanitary permits and other packaging and labeling requirements for imports of 
agricultural commodities.
8 Strict enforcement of the non-tariff protection measures was 
perceived as one mechanism that would allay the risk of a sharp rise of imports (Hoda 
and Gulati, 2005).  
Following the 1991 economic reforms, India also progressively trimmed the list 
of products that were canalized (directed to state-owned enterprises) for import. 
However, as late as 2002, imports of a few critical commodities continue to be controlled 
by State Trading Enterprises (STEs). The EXIM policy for 2002-2007 imposed further 
reform by retaining import monopolies only in respect of copra and coconut oil (State 
Trading Corporation, STC) and some cereals (Food Corporation of India, FCI).
9  
Tariff Bindings and Applied Tariffs 
                                                 
7 See Hoda and Gulati (2005) for further discussion of these developments. 
8 Among existing legislation, import of primary products of plant and animal origin are subject to “Bio 
Security and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Permits” issued by the Ministry of Agriculture under the 
conditions set out in Plants, Fruits and Seeds (Regulation of Import into India) Order, 1989. Imports of 
meat and poultry products are subject to the conditions regarding manufacture, slaughter, packing, labeling 
and quality in the Meat Food Products Order, 1973. Imports of food products, whose domestic manufacture 
and sale are governed by Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, are subject to all of its conditions. 
Import of these products must also comply with the quality and packaging requirements of the Standards of 
Weights and Measures (packaged commodities) Rules, 1977. 
9 Use of import monopolies is consistent with Article XVII of GATT 1994 as long as the agencies that have 
been granted these monopolies have a free hand in importing the canalized products. Since import tariffs 
for the canalized products remained high in general, imports had not been taking place until the end of 
2002.  
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India adopted a modified tariff schedule on March 15, 2000. The tariff bindings, 
subsequent to revision in 1996 and renegotiations within the WTO in 1999, retain the 
overall structure notified after the Uruguay Round: 100 percent for commodities, 150 
percent for processed products and 300 percent for edible oils. Departures from this 
pattern are mainly with respect of tariff lines that were negotiated as special cases.
10   
Figure 5 shows average bound tariff and applied tariffs (in 1997) for 46 
agricultural commodity groups. Of these, 33 have average bound tariffs at or above 100 
percent. For 7 of these groups, the average bound tariffs are 150 percent or higher.  
An important feature of India’s post Uruguay Round tariff structure is a wide gap 
that often exists between the bound and applied levels, as shown in Figure 5. Against the 
simple average bound tariff rate of 115 percent, the average applied rate of basic customs 
duty (as of April 1, 2002) was 35 percent (Hoda and Gulati, 2005). The WTO reports the 
simple average applied tariff on agriculture as 41 percent in 2001-02 and 37.5 percent in 
2002-03 (WTO, 2002). The WTO figures are slightly higher because they may include 
special additional duties (SAD) (WTO, 2002). The large gaps between bound and applied 
rates has two key implications. First, protection levels (even if prohibitive at the applied 
rates) are not as high as the bound rates. Second, policymakers have room for tariff 
adjustments as an instrument of agricultural policy within the WTO bound rates.  
Even with the various import policy changes implemented subsequent to 1991, 
agricultural imports remain quite low—less than $2 billion for cereals, cereal 
preparations, edible oils, pulses, sugar and cashew nuts (see Figure 6). After 1993-94, 
imports of major agricultural products increase, especially after world commodity prices 
fell in 1997-98, and the value of imports doubles by 1998-99. Then, in 1998-99, tariff 
levels sharply rise and imports fall.  
                                                 
10 In anticipation of the phasing out of QRs, in 1999 India renegotiated bound rates for some critical 
commodities. Among these items, lower bound rates apply to certain meats (35 percent), certain dairy 
products (40-60 percent), certain temperate zone fruits (30-55 percent), cereals (60-80 percent), rape seed 
oil (75 percent), soybean oil (45 percent), certain prepared meat and vegetable products (55 percent), 
certain fruit juices (85 percent), hides and skins (25 percent), and wool (25 percent).   
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Figure 5—WTO URAA Bound Agricultural Tariffs and Applied Tariffs (1997)  
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Source: WTO Agricultural Trade Policy Commitments Database (USDA/ERS, 2004).  
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Note: Agricultural imports include Cereals and Cereal Preparations, Edible Oils, Pulses, Sugar, and  
          Cashew Nuts. 
Sources: RBI (2001); Ahluwalia (2002) 
 
2.4.2  Export Policy   
Throughout much of the 1980s, restrictive import policies, direct export 
restrictions and the overvalued exchange rates imparted a considerable anti-export bias to 
the Indian economy. Exports of agricultural goods have been restricted through myriad 
controls that included prohibitions, licenses, quotas, marketing controls and minimum 
export prices (MEPs). The quantitative controls on exports were often administered 
through trading enterprises in the public and cooperative sectors, and were maintained, in 
principle, for the sake of domestic food security (WTO, 2002). Export restrictions have 
also been applied on some products for environmental and moral reasons.
11 Only a 
limited number of items, such as wheat and wheat products, barley, maize and other 
coarse cereals and their flours, ghee (butter oil) and hydrogenated vegetable oils were 
                                                 
11For example, exports of beef and tallow fat and/or oil of animal origin, excluding fish oil, are prohibited.  
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allowed for highly-regulated export subject to ceiling limits. Export licenses were 
generally required for products such as cattle, milk, cereals, edible oils, and pulses (Hoda 
and Gulati, 2005). Simultaneously, with a view to improving export competitiveness, the 
GOI provided support to exports through three instruments: cash incentives to 
manufacturers of export oriented processed foods, subsidization of freight costs, and 
income tax exemption on export earnings (Hoda and Gulati, 2005).   
Following the 1991 economic reforms, India terminated its policy of granting 
cash incentives to exports, but retained income tax exemptions for profits from exports. 
India’s agricultural export policies then began to show signs of change with the 1994 
opening up of exports of rice. Export policies have been progressively liberalized since 
then, barring the occasional reversal. Procedurally, the Ministry of Commerce, through 
the Director General of Foreign Trade, notifies the imposition or elimination of 
restrictions in order to promote exports while ensuring an “adequate” domestic supply of 
essential commodities at “reasonable” prices (WTO, 2002).  The policy reforms leading 
to the liberalization of exports include reductions in products subject to state trading, 
relaxation of export quotas, the abolition of MEPs, and increased credit availability for 
exports.
12 However, the GOI retains the authority to re-impose minimum export prices at 
its discretion.  
To further encourage exports of value-added agricultural products, agricultural 
export zones (AEZs) have been established. The purpose of the AEZs is to source raw 
agricultural products and complete their processing and packaging within a geographical 
region (GOI, 2001d). This “cluster approach” involves states identifying the regions in 
which products with export potential are being produced. Through December 2002, the 
                                                 
12 In the EXIM policy for 2002-2007, quantitative export controls applied only to a limited number of 
products including onions (exports allowed through STEs and subject to quota); paddy rice, de-oiled 
groundnut cakes, fodder, rice bran and certain seeds and planting material (exports permitted under 
licence); and niger seeds, certain seaweeds and gum karaya (exports allowed through STEs). Exporters of 
all categories of semi-processed hides and skins, and wet blue hides and skins must register with the 
Council for Leather Exports (indicating price, quantity to be exported etc.) before any products are shipped 
(Ministry of Commerce, Notification No. 45(RE-99)/1997-2002).    
18 
GOI had approved 41 AEZs in 17 states.
13 The central government contributes around 30 
percent of the total funding for AEZs, while the state governments and private bodies 
supply 15 percent and 55 percent, respectively (GOI, 2003b).   
Export subsidization by India rarely has been an issue in the past. However, when 
world cereal prices were at very low levels the late 1990s, increases in domestic support 
prices for wheat and rice in India led to increased production and procurement. 
Consequently, India’s food grain stocks grew to unusually large levels compared to usual 
carry-over quantities (Figure 7). In November 2000, the GOI initiated a policy of 
subsidies to export cereals, by offering wheat for export at a price “equal to the economic 
cost minus two years carrying cost but not lower than the central issue price for [those 
below the poverty line] BPL” (GOI, 2001a). The subsidy was expanded to rice the 
following year.  
Although still small in relation to total domestic production, the export pricing 
policy decisions resulted in growth of India’s exports of food grains to levels previously 
unseen (Table 4). The GOI has justified its export support policy under the exemption for 
developing countries from reduction commitments contained in Article 9.4 of the URAA 
with respect to export subsidies for reducing the costs of marketing and providing 
favorable internal transport charges on export shipments.
14   
                                                 
13 The central government agency responsible for the AEZs is the Agricultural and Processed Foods 
Products Development Authority (APEDA).   
14 Subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing wheat and rice exports are given at a flat rate without taking 
into account the f.o.b. value or marketing expenses incurred for each transaction. Due to these 
discrepancies, Indian export subsidies on food grains could be liable to challenge in WTO (Hoda and 
Gulati, 2005). India’s export subsidy notifications to the WTO for the years 1996-97 to 2000-01 show that 
it provided relatively small amount of export subsidies through international airfreight assistance for fresh 
fruits and vegetables, plants and flowers, and eggs (WTO document G/AG/N/IND/3, March 1, 2002).  
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Table 4—Wheat and Rice Exports, 2000/01-2002/03  
 
Year (April-March) Wheat  Rice  Total 
    (Million Metric Tons)   
2000-2001  0.81 1.53 2.34 
2001-2002  2.65 2.21 4.86 





2.5 DOMESTIC  POLICIES     
In India, domestic support for agriculture has been provided mainly through two 
channels: Minimum Support Price (MSP) guarantees for basic staple commodities and 
provision of inputs subsidies. In addition, a complex array of other policy instruments has 
been employed.  
India has witnessed only limited progress in reforms in the agricultural sector 
since economic reforms were launched in 1991. For example, only recently were steps 
taken to removal some of the countless marketing restrictions that exist. Notable among 
these, the Milk and Milk Products Order (MMPO) was reformed in July 2001 and March 
2002 to eliminate restrictions on investments in new processing capacity (GOI, Undated-
a). Other notable developments include removal in February 2003 of licensing 
requirements, stocking limits, and movement restrictions of wheat, paddy/rice, coarse 
grains, edible oilseeds and edible oils under the Essential Commodities Act of 1955 
(GOI, 2002d). In February 2003, remaining restrictions were removed on futures trading 
on 54 commodities, including wheat, rice, oilseeds and pulses that had been prohibited 
under the Forward Contract (Regulation) Act of 1952. Despite these market-oriented 
reforms, India’s domestic agriculture policies in recent years have resulted in increased 
government procurements of food grains and expansion of input subsidies for fertilizer, 
electricity and irrigation.  
2.5.1  Price Support Policies 
The domestic price support policies for agriculture have remained largely 
unaffected by the economic reforms of 1991. Basic staples in India continue to be subject 
to MSP guarantees. These commodities include paddy rice, wheat, coarse cereals, maize, 
barley, pulses (i.e. gram, arhar moong, urad), sugarcane, cotton, groundnuts, jute, 
rapeseed/mustard, sunflower, soyabean, safflower, toria, tobacco, copra, sesamum, and 
niger seed (GOI, 2001c). The stated objectives of the agricultural price policy are to 
ensure remunerative prices to the farmers, even out effects of seasonality, and promote  
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agricultural diversification (GOI, 2001c), although the guaranteed prices can be below 
prices prevailing in markets. Recommendations concerning the MSP levels are made by 
the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP). In formulating its 
recommendation, the CACP considers a number of factors, including input/output price 
parity, trends in market prices, demand and supply, inter-crop price parity, effects on 
industrial cost structure, effects on general prices, cost of living, international market 
prices, and the terms of trade (GOI, Undated-b). CACP recommendations have generally 
been followed but the MSP can vary from the CACP recommended prices, such as when 
large bonuses were given for wheat in the years 1996-1999 (Hoda and Gulati, 2005).  
India reports its MSP policies as part of the product-specific aggregate measure of 
support (AMS) in domestic support notifications for the WTO. In its AMS base period 
and its 1996-1997 notifications, the product specific support is negative because the 
MSPs are less than the external reference prices for all commodities except sugarcane 
(see Table 5).
15  
For horticultural and other agricultural commodities not covered by the MSP, 
there is a Market Intervention Scheme (MIS) of somewhat ad hoc support measures. 
Under the MIS, if the price of a commodity falls below a specific “economic” level the 
GOI can intervene, at the request of the state governments, by purchasing the product at 
intervention prices that do not exceed the cost of production (WTO, 2002).  Losses 
incurred in implementing the MIS are shared equally between the central and state 
governments. Since 1998, the MIS has been used to support a number of horticultural 
products, including oranges, coriander seed, apples, oil palm, potatoes, red chilies, areca 
nut, ginger, and onions (WTO, 2002).  
                                                 
15 Several authors have pointed out that India’s calculation of cotton AMS incorrectly compares the MSP 
for seed cotton (kapas) with the international price for lint (for example, see Hoda and Gulati, 2005). The 
AMS notifications for 1995-1997 are the latest available at this time.   
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Table 5—WTO Domestic Support Notifications, 1995-1997 
  1995 1996  1997
Green Box Payments 
General Services  397.6 239.3  264.6
Public Stockholding for Food Security 1569.7 1708.7  2018.2
Domestic Food Aid  … …  …
Decoupled Income Support  … …  …
Income Insurance and safety-net programs 10.9 …  …
Payments for relief from natural disasters 125.0 444.3  443.8
Structural adjustment through producer retirement programs … …  …
Structural adjustment through resource retirement programs … …  …
Structural adjustment through investment aids 59.2 36.3  76.1
Environment payments  33.2 73.7  70.2
Payments under regional assistance programs … …  …
Other  … …  …
Total  2195.6 2502.3  2872.9
Special and Differential Treatment 
Investments subsidies generally available to agriculture 104.8 1117.3  1142.5
Input subsideis to low income or resource poor producers 149.5 3737.8  4029.3
Total  254.3 4855.1  5171.8
Product Specific AMS 
Rice  -7,577.0 -1,321.3  -1,479.9
Wheat  -9,625.0 -1,280.8  -1,266.4
Coarse cereals   -4,530.4 -1.5  -2.9
Pulses  -1,705.8 …  …
Groundnut  -1,809.3 …  …
Rapeseed and mustard   -1,688.7 …  …
Cotton  -2,106.4 …  …
Soya bean  -191.7 …  …
Tobacco   -181.4 …  …
Jute  -387.6 …  …
Sugar cane  184.4 …  …
Total  -29,618.9 -2,603.6  -2,749.2
Non-Product Specific AMS 
Fertilizer Subsidy  1,864.1 413.6  515.9
Credit Subsidy  102.0 …  …
Subsidy on electricity  2,436.6 373.6  342.5
Irrigation subsidy  1,345.4 143.1  144.9
Subsidy on average supply of seeds 23.9 0.1  0.1
Total  5,772.1 930.3  1,003.5
as % of Value of Production  7.5% 1.1%  1.2%
Value of agricultural production  76,736.0 85,280.0  84,972.0
US$ Million 
 
Source: WTO Notifications.   
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2.5.2  Input Subsidies  
Subsidies to farmers resulting from interventions in fertilizers, electrical power 
and irrigation began to increase in the mid 1980s, and have continued to climb in current 
and constant (real) value (Table 6). In recent years, these input subsidies have reached the 
point of potentially being fiscally unsustainable and subsidies for fertilizer, power and 
irrigation have also become environmentally harmful (GOI, 2002c). The GOI claims to 
be gradually moving towards a more deregulated regime while emphasizing the need for 
investment in power, irrigation and rural infrastructure.  In the budget speech for 2002-
03, for example, the Minister of Finance highlighted, inter alia, an increased allocation of 
resources for rural roads, irrigation and credit, electrification of villages, rural 
employment (including through payment in the form of foodgrain), and measures to 
improve diversification of crops.
16  
Fertilizer 
A retention price system (RPS) for fertilizers was introduced in 1977 to insulate 
farmers from rising prices and to ensure the availability of this input. The difference 
between the “retention price” or normal cost of production (plus 12-percent post-tax 
return on investment) and the “notified sales price” (minus a distribution margin) is paid 
to manufacturers based on specific plants. A subsidy is also paid to cover the cost of 
transportation to the farming areas where fertilizer utilization is concentrated. Since there 
is a uniform issue (sales) price for domestic and imported fertilizers, the government also 
bears the net cost between the delivery cost of imported fertilizers and the price paid by 
farmers (GOI, 2002c).   
                                                 
16 To encourage capital investments by farmers the 2002-03 budget also proposes a reduction in import 
duty on agricultural machinery and implements from 25 percent to 15 percent (GOI, 2002b, Part A, 
paragraphs 20-26; and Part B, paragraph 143).  
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Table 6—Estimated Input Subsidies, 1980/81-2002/03  
Years Fertilizer Power Irrigation  Total 





1980/81 -  3.68 4.12  7.8  43.9 
1981/82  2.33 4.47 4.58  11.4  58.2 
1982/83  0.82 5.83 5.42  12.1  57.4 
1983/84  2.15 7.67 6.32  16.1  70.8 
1984/85 12.12  9.97  7.25  29.3  119.7 
1985/86 14.22  13.04  7.44  34.7  131.7 
1986/87 -0.72  17.06  10.78  27.1  96.6 
1987/88 5.27  25.35  19.72  50.3  165.2 
1988/89  18.97 30.07 23.54  72.6  187.8 
1989/90  28.58 35.94 23.09  87.6  208.4 
1990/91  45.58 46.21 25.71  117.5  253.0 
1991/92  35.07 58.84 28.68  122.6  231.9 
1992/93  32.61 73.44 32.88  138.9  241.7 
1993/94  33.52 89.57 34.41  157.5  250.1 
1994/95 78.89  112.00  39.54  230.4  334.3 
1995/96 96.94  138.38  44.12  279.4  371.8 
1996/97 96.32  155.85  44.39  296.6  367.3 
1997/98 81.59  190.21  46.56  318.4  369.6 
1998/99 83.14  224.96  49.37  357.5  384.5 
1999/2000 62.07  262.71  52.18  377.0  390.1 
2000/01 72.61  288.14  54.95  415.7  415.7 
2001/02 67.34  319.79  57.76  444.9  428.3 
2002/03 69.97  356.75  60.56  487.3  453.4 
           
 
Source: Gulati and Narayanan (2003) for 1980/91 – 2000/01. Later years are authors’ trend projections.  
 
Originally nitrogenous, phosphatic and potassic fertilizers were included under 
the price control subsidy program. However, in 1992 phosphatic and potassic fertilizers 
were decontrolled. Their prices rose dramatically leading to a fall in usage. To make 
these fertilizers available to farmers at lower prices, and to encourage balanced use 
among fertilizers, the central government has continued to provide “a concession”  
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(subsidy) for decontrolled phosphatic and potassic fertilizers (GOI, 2002c).  The total 
fertilizer subsidy in 2002-03 is estimated at Rs. 112 billion, down from Rs. 138 billion in 
2000-01, but still equal to about 3.8 percent of agricultural GDP (GOI, 2003c). The 
amount spent on the concession scheme for decontrolled fertilizer has increased 
significantly in recent years. Budgetary provision for the subsidies on decontrolled 
fertilizers for 2002-03 was Rs. 42 billion, up from Rs. 26 billion in 1997-98 (GOI, 
2002c).      
More recently, the GOI has committed to undertake modest reforms in urea 
pricing policy. Based on the recommendations of an Expenditure Reforms Commission, a 
multi-stage, group-wise concessions scheme is to be established in place of the plant-
specific retention price scheme (GOI, 2003c). During the first stage of the reform, urea 
plants will be placed in one of six groups based on vintage and feedstock, with 
concession pricing varying by group. During stage two, urea distribution is to be 
decontrolled, subject to the evaluation of the results in stage one and consultation with 
the Ministry of Agriculture (GOI, 2003c). Then by March 31, 2006 the Department of 
Fertilizers will review the implementation of the new subsidy program, assess the 
availabilities of gas and liquefied natural gas to both public and private sector companies, 
and decide on the modalities for subsequent reform measures. 
While the budgetary expenditure on fertilizer subsidies is large, a portion of the 
subsidy supports an inefficient fertilizer industry, rather than providing farmers with low 
cost inputs. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) calculate the implicit fertilizer subsidy accruing 
to farmers via an import parity price method. The price farmers would have to pay for 
imported fertilizer assuming free trade is estimated by the c.i.f. price plus internal 
marketing and transportation costs to where the farmer purchases the fertilizer.  
Comparing this price with the price that farmers actually pay gives an estimate of the 
implicit subsidy.  
Table 7 shows the actual budgetary outlays and the share of fertilizer subsidies to 
farmers estimated using this method. Overall, the average portion of the subsidy accruing 
to farmers over the period 1981-82 to 2002-2003 is nearly 70 percent.  Annual values  
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greater than 100 percent indicate that not only is the entire subsidy reported in the budget 
going to farmers, but also that the fertilizer industry is being implicitly taxed by not being 
able to charge the import parity price for fertilizer. This occurs if the import parity price 
is greater than the retention price so that the industry would have had higher revenues 
under free trade than under the retention price system.   
 
Table 7—Farmers’ Share of Fertilizer Subsidies, 1981/82-2002/03  
Year 





Farmers' share of 
budgetary subsidy 
(%) 
1981/82 2.33  3.75  62.27 
1982/83 0.82  6.05  13.48 
1983/84 2.15  10.42  20.66 
1984/85  12.12 19.27 62.91 
1985/86  14.22 19.24 73.89 
1986/87  -0.72 18.97 -3.81 
1987/88 5.27  21.64  24.37 
1988/89  18.97 32.50 58.37 
1989/90  28.58 45.42 62.93 
1990/91 45.58  43.89  103.86 
1991/92  35.07 48.00 73.05 
1992/93  32.61 57.96 56.27 
1993/94  33.52 44.00 76.19 
1994/95 78.89  52.41  150.52 
1995/96   96.94  67.35  143.93 
1996/97   96.32  75.78  127.10 
1997/98  81.59 99.18 82.26 
1998/99 83.14  115.96  71.70 
1999/2000 62.07  132.44  46.87 
2000/01  72.61    
2001/02  67.34    
2002/03  69.97    
 





  Under pricing of power to agricultural users is estimated to provide the largest 
input subsidy to the sector (Table 6). In most states, power to agriculture is offered at a 
very low price, or in a few cases it is even free.  Industrial and commercial power 
consumers, in contrast, pay prices that exceed the unit cost of supply to compensate for 
the losses on agricultural power supply (Gulati and Narayanan, 2003). Power subsidies 
are charged to the states’ budgets, and the financial problems of the State Electricity 
Boards (SEB) are often blamed on their subsidization of agricultural power (Gulati and 
Narayanan, 2003).   
  Because agricultural power consumption is not metered and is determined on a 
residual basis, it can be siphoned off to other uses. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) 
emphasize that agricultural power consumption is overstated by as much as 40 percent in 
some cases. As with fertilizer subsidies, a portion of the budgetary subsidy for electricity 
supports the inefficient supplier, in this case the SEBs. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) 
estimate the subsidy on power going to the agricultural sector by the difference between 
cost of supplying electricity to all sectors and the tariff charged to the agricultural sector 
multiplied by the quantity of electricity that is reported to be supplied to agriculture. 
Using this approach, with the caveats that agricultural use may be overstated and 
electricity suppliers inefficient, they find that the estimated subsidy in 2000-01 (Rs. 288 
billion) is more than 78 times greater than the 1980-81 figure at current prices (and 19 
times greater at constant prices).  
Irrigation 
 Irrigation  subsidies,  charged against states’ budgets, remain a mainstay of Indian 
agricultural input subsidies despite repeated attempts at reform. In most states, the pricing 
of canal water does not cover more than 20 percent of the operation and maintenance 
costs, let alone recover capital costs. While farmers are the clear beneficiaries of such 
subsidies, like the measurement of fertilizer and power subsidies, calculating irrigation  
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subsidies can also be problematic. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) compare several methods 
for calculating irrigation subsidies (Table 8). The first is the GOI’s method drawn from 
the National Accounts Statistics and used to estimate India’s irrigation subsidy in its 
domestic support notification submitted to the WTO. It is calculated by the difference 
between the cost of supplying water for irrigation and the revenue received as payment 
from irrigation water users.  Gulati and Narayanan (2003) propose instead to follow 
suggestions by the Vaidyanathan Committee (GOI, 1992) that suggests that pricing of 
canal water should cover operation and maintenance expenses plus one percent of 
cumulative capital expenditures. Gulati and Narayanan (2003) apply this method to 
major, medium and minor irrigation projects and derive the subsidy estimates shown in 
Table 6.   
Other irrigation subsidy programs include the Accelerated Irrigation Benefit 
Program (AIBP) begun in 1996-97 to assist states complete ongoing irrigation projects. 
Beginning in 1999-2000, minor irrigation schemes in the northeast region, hill states and 
drought prone regions were included under AIBP.  In addition, effective February 1, 
2002, approved medium and major irrigation projects that can be completed within one 
year are entitled to funding under a Fast Track Program of the AIBP (GOI, 2003c).  
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Table 8—Comparison of Estimates of Irrigation Subsidies, 1980/81-2002/2003 
 
Years  Government 
Estimates 
Vaidyanathan 
Committee Method  O&M Method 
   --------------------in Rs.million-------------------- 
1980/81 5,810  4,121  2,744 
1981/82 6,360  4,578  2,996 
1982/83 7,420  5,424  3,589 
1983/84 7,930  6,320  4,173 
1984/85 10,800  7,255  4,724 
1985/86 11,440  7,440  4,656 
1986/87 15,200  10,779  7,682 
1987/88 16,280  19,715  16,234 
1988/89 22,300  23,544  19,588 
1989/90 24,390  23,088  18,547 
1990/91 24,680  25,713  20,828 
1991/92 31,470  28,681  23,429 
1992/93 34,890  32,876  27,220 
1993/94 39,490  34,414  28,296 
1994/95 45,790  39,542  32,889 
1995/96 53,990  44,118  36,894 
1996/97 62,750  44,394  36,290 
1997/98 70,940  46,557  38,692 
1998/99   49,367 41,093 
1999/2000     52,177  43,495 
2000/01   54,954   
2001/02   57,758   
2002/03   60,563   
 
Source: Gulati and Narayanan (2003) for 1980/91 – 199/2000. Later years are authors’ calculations.   
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Other Input Subsidies 
In addition to the interventions discussed above, there are a number of other input 
subsidy programs. There are several different kinds of subsidies on seeds. For example, 
the cost of transporting seeds is subsidized in some state with the objective of ensuring 
universal and timely access (WTO, 2002).
17 The National Seed Policy of 2001 seeks to 
provide farmers with superior quality seeds. Under the Seed Bank Scheme, introduced in 
1999-2000, seeds are also made available in cases of natural calamity and seed storage 
infrastructure is to be developed. Grants are provided to participating seed corporations 
for maintenance of certified and foundation seeds. The total cost of the various seed 
subsidies, however, is relatively minor.  
Preferential agricultural credit provided through concessional interest rates, while 
once a substantial input subsidy, has been progressively phased out.  In October 1994, the 
Reserve Bank of India mostly deregulated the interest rate structure for cooperatives to 
lend and raise deposits. In August 1996, the Reserve Bank also deregulated the lending 
rates of regional rural banks. However, to ensure a flow of agricultural credit, 18 percent 
of net bank credit of all commercial banks is earmarked for agriculture. The Kissan 
Credit Card (KCC) Scheme was introduced in 1998-99 to facilitate access to short-term 
credit by farmers. By September 2002, a total of 271,000 cards and credit of Rs. 640 
billion had been created under this program (GOI, 2003c). The National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), the major supplier of rural credit, has 
also taken several other initiatives to facilitate credit flows (GOI, 2001c).
18  
In the area of broader rural development, a Rural Infrastructure Development 
Fund (RIDF) has a cumulative value from its inception in 1995-96 to January 3, 2003 of 
                                                 
17 The subsidy is provided in the states of Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh,  Jammu and Kashmir, Uttaranchal 
and the Hill Areas of West Bengal (Department of Agriculture and Co-operation 
http://agricoop.nic.in/2seeds.htm). 
18 The initiatives include recapitalization of regional rural banks (RRBs); and preparation of Development 
Action Plans (DAPs) and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to strengthen Cooperative Banks and 
RRBs.  The RBI has also advised banks to prepare an annual action plan for disbursement of credit to 
agriculture; accordingly, each bank is preparing a Special Agricultural Credit Plan (SACP). (GOI, 2001c).  
31 
Rs. 285 billion (GOI, 2003c). In the Budget Speech of 2002-03, it was announced that the 
assistance to states provided through RIDF would be linked to reforms in the agriculture 
and rural sectors. Yet, at least 60 percent of the RIDF for 2003-04 will be directed toward 
irrigation, flood control, agriculture and allied activities and power systems (NABARD, 
2003). 
WTO Input Subsidy and Green Box Notifications  
India initially reported its fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, seed and credit 
subsidies to the WTO under non-product specific support commitments. Despite its high 
levels of recent expenditures, India’s non-product specific support has been less than the 
de minimis for developing countries of 10 percent of total value of agricultural production 
(see Table 5). India’s non-product specific AMS decreased from $5,772.1 million in 1995 
to $930.3 million in 1997 (still the latest notification available), due to a shift in the 
accounting of input subsidies from non-product specific support to special and 
differential treatment.
19 India’s green box payments in 1995-1997 are dominated by 
expenditures on public stockholding for food security and totalled $2,872.9 million in 
1997.  
                                                 
19 See Hoda and Gulati (2005) for details.  
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3.  PSE METHODOLOGY: DESCRIPTION AND ISSUES IN 
APPLICATIONS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
  
The methodology of our analysis is the approach utilized by the OECD to 
measure PSEs (Portugal, 2002) with modifications described below and elaborated more 
fully by Mullen et al. (2004). Within the PSE, policies are categorized into one of eight 
subcategories. Market price support (MPS) is defined as the component that is an 
“indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers 
to agricultural producers arising from policy measures that create a gap between domestic 
market prices and border prices of a specific commodity measured at the farmgate level” 
(Portugal, 2002, p. 2). It is calculated based on the difference between the domestic price 
and an equivalent world price of a commodity. The seven other subcategories of support 
are measured by budgetary outlays for various types of government payments that 
support farmers. On average for OECD countries, the total MPS (for all of agriculture) 
accounted for 63 percent of the total PSE in 2000-2002 (OECD, 2003a). OECD also 
reports Consumer Support Estimates (CSEs) and General Services Support Estimates 
(GSSEs) but our analysis for India is limited to PSEs. 
3.1  ESTIMATING MARKET PRICE SUPPORT (MPS) 
Assuming competitive markets, ex post price certainty, and a small open economy 
whereby a nation’s domestic and border policies do not affect world prices, the domestic 
farmgate price, Pd , is compared to an adjusted reference price, Par. The types of 
adjustments made to determine Par are shown, for an imported and an exported 
commodity respectively, in equations (1) and (2): 
(1)  Par  =  Pr  + (Cp + Td1 ) – (Td2 + M ) – Qadj  (importable) 
 
(2)  Par  =  Pr –  (Cp + Td1 ) – (Td2 + M ) – Qadj  (exportable) 
 
 
The reference price at the border, Pr , is the “world market” c.i.f. price for an 
importer or f.o.b. price for an exporter expressed in the domestic currency. The reference  
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price is commonly measured either from observed unit values for imports and exports of 
the country or from observed international prices adjusted by international transportation 
costs. Under the latter approach, if the commodity is imported Pr  can be imputed from 
the f.o.b. price of a major exporting country, Pexporterfob, plus the international freight, Ti , 
and other international costs (including insurance and margins) of moving the commodity 
from the exporting country to the importing country, Ci , according to:   
 
(3)  Pr = Pexporterfob + ( Ti + Ci ) 
 
If the country is an exporter of the commodity, the point of comparison in world markets 
between the country’s export price and the international price takes place as arbitraged at 
the border of a third country importer (i.e. the c.i.f. price in that third country). Similar to 
(3), the reference price at the border of the exporting country can be imputed from the 
c.i.f. price of a major importing country, Pimportercif minus the costs associated with 
moving the commodity from the exporting country in question to the importing country 
according to:   
 
(4)  Pr = Pimportercif  - ( Ti + Ci ).  
 
Once a relevant international reference price is determined, it is then further 
adjusted by the port charges (Cp ), the costs of handling, transporting and marketing 
between the port and the wholesale market (Td1), the costs of handling and transporting 
(Td2) and marketing and processing (M) the commodity between the farm and the 
wholesale market, and by any needed adjustment for differences in quality between the 
domestic and internationally produced commodity (Qadj ), as shown in equations 1 and 
2.
20 The price gap at the farmgate level, ΔP = Pd - Par , then is a monetary measure of 
market price support per unit of output.  Ideally, ΔP captures the differences induced by 
                                                 
20 In the equations Qadj > 0 implies that the domestic quality is lower than the quality of the internationally traded 
commodity.   
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visible and invisible policy interventions. Expressed in percentage terms relative to the 
reference price (ΔP/ Par), the price gap is a traditional nominal rate of protection (NRP), 
or as we refer to it later, the “%MPS.” The total MPS for any commodity is given by the 
per unit price gap multiplied by the level of output.   
The difficulties in assessing market price gaps in reality are substantial, especially 
in developing countries owing to several reasons. First, the developing countries are more 
likely to utilize border policies or commodity price support programs backed by market 
interventions and government stockholding. These are policies whose effects are 
measured in an MPS. Exchange rates also may play an important role in the interpretation 
of the results. Second, with less developed infrastructure, various costs associated with 
adjusting the reference price are likely to have larger impacts. Moreover, in the case of 
large developing countries, MPS or budgetary expenditures may differ substantially 
among different regions. Third, developing countries may be more likely than developed 
countries to switch from being an importer to being an exporter of a commodity across 
years. The relevant international reference price adjustments for internal costs will then 
differ depending on the trade circumstances as shown in equations (1) and (2) and 
discussed further below. Fourth, the price gap in developing countries, and difficulties in 
assessing its policy component, may be accentuated by imperfect competition in the 
handling, transportation, processing or marketing sectors. Imperfect competition in these 
sectors would affect the mark-ups, but with different implications than border or price 
support interventions. Fifth, government polices toward markets or processing and 
infrastructure investments can raise costs by restricting efficient domestic movement, 
processing and marketing. These are also policy effects which would influence the 
observed price gaps, but addressing these sources of inefficiency would require quite 
different reforms or investments than price support or border protection measures.
21 
Sixth, even if competitive market forces are functioning relatively well in the handling, 
transportation, processing and marketing sectors, acquiring the requisite data on various 
                                                 
21 We thank Rip Landes for emphasizing this point.   
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costs may be particularly resource intensive (beyond plausible research budgets) or 
consistent data over a range of years may simply not exist.  
Since a substantial amount of data is required to calculate the price gaps, attempts 
to assess market price support in a developing country context need to be geared toward 
trying to reduce the measurement error. The importance of errors related to various 
within-country adjustments to the reference price will vary among situations. In case of 
commodities that require complex processing, a substantial determinant of the MPS will 
be the adjustments to the reference price for these processing costs. In such cases, a 
comparison is sometimes made between the reference price of the processed commodity 
and the domestic price of that processed commodity at the wholesale level. Such a 
comparison might be more accurate than an estimated farmgate comparison given 
available data, but it does not separate protection (or disprotection) between domestic 
farmers and processors. This could be an important distinction, especially if processing is 
inefficient or non-competitive (see Cahill and Legg, 1990 and Doyon et al., 2001). 
3.2  BUDGETARY PAYMENTS AND PRODUCT-SPECIFIC PSEs 
In the OECD measurement of PSEs, budgetary payments are divided into seven 
subcategories depending on the conditions of eligibility on which transfers are made to 
farmers: those based on 1) output; 2) area planted/animal numbers; 3) historical 
entitlements; 4) input use; 5) input constraints; 6) overall farming income; and 7) 
miscellaneous payments.
22 The patterns and levels of budgetary expenditures on 
agricultural support by developing countries are likely to differ substantially from those 
of wealthier OECD countries. In transition (and developing) economies, particular care 
must be taken to include budgetary assistance even when it is not associated with actual 
direct payments (Melyukhina, 2002).  Preferential prices for inputs such as fertilizer, 
electricity, irrigation and transportation are often more important in developing than 
developed countries, as in the case of India. These subsidies are categorized as budgetary 
                                                 
22 With the increased use of support payments in developed countries that are at least partially decoupled 
from current production of any particular crop, the OECD is in the process of redefining if and how 
different program payments should be allocated to individual commodities (OECD, 2003b).  
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payments, though subsidies on tradable inputs at the farmgate level may be better 
measured through a price gap method analogous to the calculation of MPS for output 
commodities than by government expenditures, as Gulati and Narayanan (2003) have 
demonstrated.    
The calculation of product-specific PSEs requires that budgetary payments be 
allocated across commodities to determine the budgetary support for a given product, 
BPj, where “j” denotes a specific commodity. If such payments are reported by 
commodity, the procedure is straightforward. However, for payments such as input 
subsidies or general subsidies such as tax or capital grants, calculations of allocation 
across commodities can be complicated. In this case, the payments are often distributed 
on the basis of each commodity’s share in total value of agricultural production 
(Melyukhina, 2002). Other criteria, such as the share of acreage also provide plausible 
approximations, although each may introduce a measurement error. 
Once budgetary payments are allocated among commodities, the product-specific 
PSE is the sum of the MPS and budgetary support for that commodity. As discussed in 
Mullen et al. (2004), the product-specific PSE can be expressed on a percentage basis in 
two ways. The first approach, as in the OECD studies, finds the proportion of gross farm 
income that is a result of policy measures, using (VPj + BPj ) as the denominator of its 
percentage measure, where VPj  is the value of production at domestic producer prices. 
An alternative (“trade economist’s”) measure (denominator) is to express support 
received by farmers as a percentage of the value of output at farmgate-equivalent 
international prices, VPi*. Because production is valued at international prices in the 
%MPS and the trade economist’s %PSE denominator, while the PSE numerator includes 
the MPS and budget payments, the trade economist’s %PSE will always be at least as 
high or higher than the %MPS (assuming net budgetary payments are positive). Quite 
different numerical representation of the policy effects can arise with the OECD %PSE 
because the denominator for this measure is the value of farm output at domestic prices 
plus budget payments.   
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3.3  CALCULATING TOTAL PSEs 
The total PSE expressed in nominal terms for all agricultural producers is the 
sum of an aggregate MPS (the price gap per unit of each output multiplied by the quantity 
of output, summed over all outputs included in the analysis) and aggregate budgetary 
transfers. In the OECD approach, the calculation of aggregate MPS consists of three 
steps. First, a nominal value of MPS is estimated for individual products, the set of which 
is known as the covered “MPS commodities.” The second step is to sum the product-
specific MPS results into an MPSc for the covered commodities. One method to estimate 
the total nominal PSE for a country (not used by OECD) is to include only the market 
price support derived for these commodities in the calculation: PSEc = MPSc + BP, 
where BP is the total budgetary payments to producers. In the OECD approach, a third 
step is made to calculate the PSE. The MPSc for covered commodities is “scaled up” to 
all products based on the share (k) of the covered commodities in the total value of 
production. The final step or “MPS extrapolation procedure” can be expressed as MPS = 
MPSc/k, where MPS is the estimated total market price support.  
With the scaling up, the OECD “Total PSE” is calculated as PSE = MPS + BP. 
Either approximation (not scaled up or scaled up) introduces error, and any error is 
relatively more or less important as the MPS component of the PSE increases relative to 
the budget payment component. For developing countries, feasible commodity coverage 
is likely to be less than for the OECD countries, and the assumption imposed by scaling 
up may be unrealistic if support is concentrated among those products included in the 
analysis.  
  Total PSE measures can be expressed on a percentage basis. The measure 
reported by OECD uses (VP + BP) as the denominator (where VP is the total value of 
agricultural production at domestic producer prices). This %PSE gives a “subsidy 
counter’s” measure of support relative to domestic farm revenue. Alternatively, a “trade 
economist’s” measure of support uses VP* as the denominator to give %PSE relative to 
the value of output at international prices. Because value of total production at  
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international prices may not be known, an approximation is required. One approach is 
simply to subtract MPSc from VP. This corresponds to not scaling up MPSc in computing 
the nominal value of PSE because commodities not covered are assumed to have the 
same value at international and domestic prices. Alternatively, an estimate of VP* can be 
based on scaling up the value of production at international prices of the covered 
commodities by the same “k” as above.  
3.4  MODIFIED PROCEDURE TO ACCOUNT FOR DOMESTIC MARKET-
CLEARING PRICES 
Beyond the practical difficulties in obtaining the necessary data to compute PSEs, 
another factor is likely to be relevant to their measurement and interpretation for 
developing countries. World price fluctuations, changes in the government intervention 
price levels, and domestic supply and demand shocks are all factors that affect whether a 
country will be importing or exporting, or, alternatively depleting or accumulating stocks 
(of storable commodities).  
Byerlee and Morris (1993) pointed out that the likelihood that any of these factors 
results in a change in the trade status of a country is greater if the country is near self-
sufficiency in a particular commodity. They suggest that under these circumstances 
(which describe the situation for cereals in many developing countries) agricultural 
protection indicators computed by the conventional methods of comparing the domestic 
price to an import or export adjusted reference price can lead to an incorrect estimate of 
the level and even the direction of protection. Instead, a corrected protection measure 
may need to be calculated based on a domestic market-clearing equilibrium price as the 
“adjusted reference price” rather than the import or export price, especially when a 
country has relatively high internal or external transport costs, so that there is a wide gap 
between the adjusted reference prices for imports versus exports (from here on, the 
adjusted reference price for exports will be denoted Pe and for imports Pm). Byerlee and 
Morris demonstrate this approach for Pakistan, which was more than 85 percent self-
sufficient in wheat during 1985-90, had a controlled producer price slightly above the 
export price and well below the import price, and was a net importer of wheat.  
39 
Conventional measures of support showed the domestic price as much as 40 percent 
lower than the adjusted import reference price. But Byerlee and Morris conclude that if 
controls were removed the price only would have increased by about 10 percent to a 
domestic market-clearing level. 
Byerlee and Morris provide a more systematic approach than relying on the 
current direction of trade to dictate the adjusted reference price used to evaluate the MPS 
component of the PSE, but one that required additional assumptions about elasticities of 
demand and supply. In order to know which price will be relevant when the policy 
intervention is removed, one must know the relationships among the autarky equilibrium 
price, P
*, and the adjusted reference prices Pm and Pe. Because of international and 
domestic cost adjustments, it is always the case that Pm> Pe. When P
*>Pm, then Pm is the 
relevant Par; when Pe>P
*, then Pe is the relevant Par; and when Pm>P
*>Pe, then P
* is the 
relevant Par. This price relationship, not the observed trade under the policies in place, 
determines the level of protection or disprotection relative to the price level that would 
exist in the absence of the policy interventions. The argument is shown graphically in 
Figure 8 under the assumption of fixed supply.  
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Figure 8—Computing the MPS Under Alternative Price Scenarios 
    
     
    a. If P
*>Pm, then Pm is the relevant Par         b. If Pe>P
*, then Pe is the relevant Par    c. If Pm>P
*>Pe, then P
* is the relevant Par  
 
Figure 1 shows that the relevant reference price depends on the relationship between P
* and 
 Pm and Pe. In the three panels, P1 - P4 are possible prices set 
by domestic policy. As shown in panel 1c, if Pm>P
*>Pe, then P
* is the relevant reference price. Whether the domestic policy supports agriculture (at P4 ) 
or disprotects agriculture (at P1 ), when the policy is removed the price becomes P
*. Likewise in panels 1a and 1b, regardless of the level of the domestic 
price set by policy or the corresponding trade pattern, Pm and Pe are the relevant reference prices under the price relationships specified. In the figure 
and our empirical calculations, we treat annual production as pre-determined (consistent with interpretation of PSEs as transfers to farmers given an 
observed fixed supply) but allow demand to adjust to clear the market in our counter-factual annual determinations of P
* . If we let the supply also 
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4.  REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
Several recent studies have evaluated protection and disprotection of Indian 
agriculture using PSEs and related measures. Gulati and Kelley (1999) estimate nominal 
protection coefficients (NPCs), effective protection coefficients (EPCs), and effective 
subsidy coefficients (ESCs) for major crops for the period 1980-1993.  The NPC, as 
described above, is the ratio of domestic price to the adjusted world reference price. The 
EPC also accounts for protection of tradable inputs.  It is defined as the ratio of value 
added at domestic prices to value added at world reference prices, where value added 
refers to the difference between output price and the value of all traded inputs used to 
produce one unit of output.  If traded inputs contribute a relatively small portion of total 
cost of inputs, the NPC and EPC will yield similar results.  However, if traded inputs 
make up a significant portion of the total cost of inputs, there could be a divergence 
between the two measures.  The ESC adjusts, in addition, for subsidies and taxes on non-
traded inputs. It is defined as the ratio of value added at domestic prices (adjusted for 
subsidies and taxes on non-traded inputs) to the value added at world reference prices. 
Gulati and Kelley (1999) use both official and shadow exchange rates (assumed to 
be 20 percent higher on average than official rates) to evaluate the levels of these three 
policy indicators. They conduct their analysis under the assumption that all major 
commodities are imported (the importable hypothesis) and also, alternatively, under the 
assumption that wheat, rice and cotton are exported (the exportable hypothesis). The 
authors argue that these three commodities are export competitive in the long run.  
A USDA study provided the first estimates of PSEs (and also consumer subsidy 
equivalents, CSEs) for India (USDA-ERS, 1994). This study covers the period 1982-
1990, with PSEs computed on the basis of ten commodities ((rice, wheat, maize, 
sorghum, peanuts (groundnuts), chickpeas, rapeseed, soybean, and medium- and long-
staple cotton). The policies covered include price interventions and input subsidies, 
including fertilizer, electricity, irrigation and credit. Except for cotton, USDA compared  
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the production-weighted average of the state harvest prices with an annual average world 
reference price equal to the c.i.f. India (landed) price at the prevailing exchange rate, 
implying that each commodity is assumed to be imported. Adjustments were made to 
account for internal transportation and other costs. 
In addition to the ERS PSE study, Gulati and Narayanan (2003) estimate PSEs for 
Indian agriculture over the period 1986-2000 based on 13 commodities (rice, wheat, 
maize, sorghum, sugar, bajra, gram, groundnut, rapeseed/mustard, soybean, sunflower, 
cotton and jute) assuming all are imported.  They also calculated PSEs assuming that all 
the products are export competitive (Gulati and Narayanan, 2003 unpublished).  Their 
methodology broadly follows that of ERS or the OECD and they provide one of the few, 
if not the only, comprehensive PSE estimates for India during the 1990s.  
Gulati and Narayanan divide support into product specific (price support) and 
non-product specific (input subsidies). They use Minimum Support Price (MSP) or 
corresponding wholesale-level “procurement prices,” instead of market farmgate or 
wholesale price, as their domestic prices, even when market prices exceed the MSP or 
procurement rates, as often the case. They estimate the price gap for the set of covered 
commodities as the difference between the domestic price and the landed cost (equal to 
the c.i.f. price plus port clearance charges) corresponding to the months of the crop’s 
harvest season, when the bulk of the domestically produced commodity is sold.  Like the 
USDA and OECD PSE studies, they take exchange rates at official levels.  
Fertilizer, power, irrigation and credit subsidies are included by Gulati and 
Narayanan within non-product specific support. Fertilizer subsidies are computed from 
the difference between the import parity level and what the farmer pays, as discussed 
above. Power subsidy per unit is the difference between the unit cost of power supplied to 
the economy and the average tariff for agricultural consumers. Irrigation subsidies are 
based on the National Account Statistics Irrigation subsidy and are estimated by the 
difference between operating and maintenance expenses and the total direct receipts of 
major and medium irrigation works. Credit subsidy is the amount foregone on account of  
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concessional rates of interest on short term lending (six months) lending to the 
agricultural sector.
23  
Instead of allocating the non-product specific input subsidies among commodities 
to compute product-specific PSEs, Gulati and Narayanan (2003) include these subsidies 
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This is equivalent to the OECD “scaled up” PSE measure but with only the value of 
production at domestic prices (not budget payments as well) in the denominator.
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Figure 9 shows the PSEs of Gulati and Narayanan (2003) through 2000 under 
both the importable and exportable hypotheses, together with those from USDA through 
1990. PSEs calculated by Gulati and Narayanan (2003) under the importable hypothesis 
are negative throughout the entire period, implying that agriculture is net taxed.  
Comparing their results with those of USDA (also computed under the importable 
hypothesis), the temporal pattern is the same, although the USDA estimates are from 8 to 
27 percentage points higher in 1986-1990. Under the exportable hypothesis, negative 
market price support outweighs the positive non-product specific (input) subsidies in all 
years except for 1986-1988 and 2000 when market price support turns positive due to 
relatively low international prices and/or high MSP/procurement prices.  
                                                 
23 Unlike the USDA study, Gulati and Narayanan (2003) do not take into consideration medium or long 
term preferential lending nor do they consider defaults as a part of government outlays for credit subsidies. 
24 The second term of Gulati and Narayanan (2003) is equivalent to a scaled up OECD MPS measure 
because both the numerator and denominator refer only to the covered commodities. Scaling up both the 
numerator and denominator would not change the percentage support due to product-specific measures.  
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Note: Gulati and Narayanan PSE computed on the basis of 12 commodities under importable hypothesis. 
Sources: USDA 1994, Gulati and Narayanan (2003) for importable hypothesis and Gulati and Narayanan  
               unpublished data for exportable hypothesis. 
 
5.  PRODUCT-SPECIFIC MPS AND PSEs  
  As discussed above, computing PSEs is an intensive empirical exercise; in order 
to obtain relatively accurate estimates data for all of the variables in equations (1) and (2) 
should be available along with subsidy information by commodity. In reality, the 
empirical estimation of PSEs relies on the available data as well as on and the subjective 
judgment of the researcher to minimize measurement errors. 
5.1  DATA AND OVERVIEW OF CALCULATIONS   
Our calculation of PSEs for India draws heavily on previous studies by Gulati et 
al. (1990), Gulati and Kelley (1999), Gulati and Narayanan (2003), and Gulati and 
Pursell (forthcoming). In this paper, PSEs are computed from 1985 to 2002 for 11 
commodities: cereals (wheat (through 2003), rice, corn, and sorghum), sugar, oilseeds 
(groundnut, rapeseed, soybean, and sunflower), pulses (chickpeas), and cotton. These 
crops accounted for an average of 45 percent of the total value of agricultural production  
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in India during 1985-2002. The value of production at domestic prices, levels of 
production, and net trade (exports – imports) are shown for each commodity in Table 9. 
Prices and Cost Adjustments 
Data for computing the MPS is taken directly from the detailed database for 1964-
65 to 2001-02 of Gulati and Pursell (forthcoming). A description of the price data and 
adjustments for each commodity is given in Table 10. The data includes international 
reference prices for all major Indian crops, exchange rates, international costs and port 
charges. It also includes production quantities, farmgate or wholesale domestic prices, 
domestic transport costs, and marketing and processing margins for important producing 
states.  
Sources for international prices in the database vary by commodity and include 
USDA and FAO for cereals, Oil World for some oilseeds, and IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) for various other commodities. Exchange rates are taken from 
the IFS market rates. International freight for wheat is drawn from an annual series in the 
FAO Trade Yearbook, 1999 and adjusted for subsequent years. International freight for 
other commodities is given by adjusting the wheat freight rate if other rates are not 
available.  
Domestic prices are taken from Agricultural Prices in India (various years) and 
production data is from Agricultural Statistics at a Glance (various years). Estimates of 
port charges and domestic transportation costs are based on an earlier study by Sharma 
(1991) and are projected forward using the procedure described in Pursell and Gupta 
(1996). Marketing costs are taken as a percentage of Pd of each commodity and vary from 
5 percent to 10 percent. For products requiring substantial processing, the prices included 
are at the wholesale (processed) level. For these commodities, the subsequent MPS 
calculations are made with price comparisons between adjusted references prices and 
prices of equivalent commodities at the wholesale, not farmgate, level.   
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Table 9—Production, Value of Production and Net Exports for Eleven Commodities, 1985-2002 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cereals
Wheat
Production (MMT) 44.1 47.1 44.3 46.2 54.1 49.9 55.1 55.7 57.2 59.8 65.8 62.1 69.4 66.3 71.3 76.4 68.8 73.5 69.3
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 67.0 73.9 71.8 76.6 93.6 91.2 118.6 125.3 157.3 197.3 230.3 223.6 263.5 315.1 363.6 420.0 398.8 448.5 429.8
Net Trade (MMT) 0.35 0.49 0.49 -2.08 -0.08 0.10 0.58 -2.45 -0.47 0.07 1.45 0.56 -1.73 -2.20 -1.17 1.13 3.06 4.82 3.95
Rice
Production (MMT) 58.3 63.8 60.6 56.9 70.5 73.6 74.3 74.7 72.9 80.3 81.8 77.0 81.7 82.5 86.1 89.7 84.9 90.8
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 131.1 148.2 144.6 127.3 184.3 221.2 250.9 288.6 329.3 414.7 463.7 466.4 551.7 638.4 724.5 788.6 725.6 772.1
Net Trade (MMT) 0.25 0.35 -0.45 -0.20 0.45 0.70 0.59 0.60 0.75 4.15 3.70 2.10 3.99 3.35 1.31 1.69 6.30 4.50
Coarse Grains
Corn
Production (MMT) 8.4 6.6 7.6 5.7 8.2 9.7 9.0 8.1 10.0 9.6 8.9 9.5 10.8 10.8 11.2 11.5 12.1 13.2
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 11.2 11.2 13.4 11.4 16.7 18.0 19.8 29.4 27.2 27.0 37.0 38.4 48.1 42.2 53.5 61.8 60.5 65.2
Net Trade (MMT) 0.01 0.01 -0.28 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.17 -0.23 0.05 0.02 0.05
Sorghum
Production (MMT) 11.4 10.2 9.2 12.2 10.2 12.9 11.7 8.1 12.8 11.4 9.0 9.3 10.9 7.5 8.4 8.7 7.7 8.3
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 19.9 19.5 18.7 26.0 28.1 36.6 29.8 24.4 38.8 30.6 32.6 45.7 53.9 39.0 62.6 68.5 46.0 44.0
Net Trade (MMT) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Sugar
Production (MMT) 6.1 7.0 8.5 9.1 8.8 11.0 12.0 13.4 10.6 9.8 14.6 16.5 12.9 12.9 15.5 18.2 18.5 18.3
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 24.6 31.3 38.9 45.8 48.8 66.9 74.7 89.0 84.1 99.5 140.4 170.1 144.4 154.2 186.0 227.0 243.1 240.4
Net Trade (MMT) -1.28 -1.69 -1.00 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.24 0.59 0.39 -1.47 -0.65 0.94 0.40 -0.98 -1.07 -0.41 1.36 1.03
Oilseeds
Groundnuts
Production (MMT) 6.4 5.1 5.9 5.9 9.7 8.1 7.5 7.1 8.6 7.8 8.1 7.6 8.6 7.4 9.0 5.3 6.2 7.1
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 29.1 23.6 32.3 38.9 50.5 59.1 72.3 70.9 71.6 68.9 87.4 88.2 107.0 89.3 121.7 67.8 74.2 94.3
Net Trade (MMT) 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.20 0.16 0.06
Rapeseed
Production (MMT) 3.1 2.7 2.6 3.5 4.4 4.1 5.2 5.9 4.8 5.3 5.8 6.0 6.7 4.7 5.7 5.8 4.2 5.3
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 15.7 10.8 11.4 23.9 32.0 23.5 49.0 54.7 43.6 54.8 68.7 68.7 76.6 66.9 86.9 73.2 52.4 70.2
Net Trade (MMT) 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Soybeans
Production (MMT) 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.8 2.6 2.5 3.4 4.7 3.9 5.1 5.4 6.5 7.1 7.1 5.3 5.9 4.3
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 2.7 2.5 3.8 8.5 9.5 13.2 14.6 27.6 34.6 31.1 47.2 51.8 75.6 77.0 63.9 45.8 56.6 41.7
Net Trade (MMT) 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sunflower
Production (MMT) 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 1.1 2.1 4.4 2.4 3.8 6.9 12.6 12.0 12.4 12.9 15.5 14.7 10.3 12.1 8.2 7.9 10.4 15.0




Note: Value of production is based on the weighted average value of production in the states included under the importable hypothesis. Cotton production and value of production refers to kapas and net trade to cotton 
lint. 
Source: Gulati spreadsheets; Gulati and Bathla, 2001; USDA-FAS PSD Database, 2004. 
 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Pulses
Chickpea
Production (MMT) 4.6 5.8 4.5 3.6 5.1 4.2 5.4 4.1 4.4 5.0 6.4 5.0 5.6 6.1 6.8 5.1 3.5 5.1
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 19.5 27.7 15.1 14.9 33.1 25.9 36.5 27.2 29.4 52.8 71.7 40.4 58.7 84.6 80.0 63.1 54.5 94.1
Net Trade (MMT) -0.03 -0.02 -0.23 -0.21 -0.06 -0.15 -0.10 -0.07 -0.15 -0.06 -0.01 -0.12 -0.38 -0.11 -0.01 -0.06 -0.52 -0.22
Cotton
Production (MMT) 4.3 4.5 3.5 3.3 4.5 5.8 5.0 5.0 5.8 5.5 6.1 6.6 7.3 5.5 6.3 5.9 4.9 5.1
Value of Production (Bil. Rs) 24.6 21.9 20.9 38.5 38.1 49.4 55.0 67.5 59.1 92.3 144.0 115.1 131.6 126.5 122.2 109.1 94.5 83.2
Net Trade (MMT) 0.07 0.22 -0.02 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.02 0.19 0.03 -0.07 0.10 0.26 0.04 -0.07 -0.33 -0.32 -0.41 -0.29
Total Value of Production (Bil Rs)
of included commodities 346.4 372.6 375.2 414.2 538.5 611.9 733.9 816.6 887.5 1081.9 1338.5 1323.1 1521.3 1645.3 1873.1 1932.9 1816.7 1968.7
of all agriculture 790.0 821.1 857.4 855.7 1104.6 1284.3 1441.2 1946.6 2205.0 2717.9 2852.3 3032.3 3478.7 3582.0 4362.4 4550.4 4693.6 5177.2 
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 Table 10—Reference Price Adjustments: Description and Sources  
  Cereals and Coarse Grains 
Category Wheat  Rice  Maize  Sorghum 
Period  Coverage  (calendar  years) 1985-2003 1985-2002 1985-2002 1987-2002 
      
Trade  Status  Variable Variable Variable Variable 
      
Reference Domestic Market  Farmgate  Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale 
      
Border  Price      
  •  World price (Pexporter fob)  F.o.b. U.S. Gulf, HRW 
ordinary protein; 
monthly average for 
India’s harvest season 
(April-June) 
F.o.b. Bangkok, Thai 
15% broken; monthly 
average for India’s 
harvest season (October-
January) 
F.o.b. U.S. gulf ports, 
Yellow No.2; monthly 
average for India’s 
harvest season (October-
January) 
F.o.b. U.S. gulf ports; 
monthly average for 
India’s harvest season 
(October-January) 








        
  •  International freight (Ti + Ci)   U.S. Gulf to India  Freight index 
constructed from the 
wheat freight rates 
Assumed to equal freight 
rates for wheat 
Assumed to equal freight 
rates for wheat 








        
  •  Exchange rate (ER)  Monthly average for 
harvest season. 
Monthly average for 
harvest season. 
Monthly average for 
harvest season. 
Monthly average for 
harvest season. 








      
Domestic Cost Adjustments 
    Surplus Regions
 
    
        
  Included states  Haryana and Punjab  
 
 
Andhra Pradesh and 
Punjab  
 
Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, 




and Madhya Pradesh 
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Table 10 (continued) 
  Cereals and Coarse Grains 
Category Wheat  Rice  Maize  Sorghum 
        
  Port charges (Cp)  In 1983/84 calculated to 
be Rs. 10.18 per quintal; 
cost has been projected 
using the port index 
In 1983/84 calculated to 
be Rs. 10.18 per quintal; 
cost has been projected 
using the port index 
In 1983/84 calculated to 
be Rs. 10.18 per quintal; 
cost has been projected 
using the port index 
In 1983/84 calculated to 
be Rs. 10.18 per quintal; 
cost has been projected 
using the port index 
  Transportation, handling and marketing 
costs from port to port-city wholesale 
market (Td1) 
No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment 
        
  Transportation and handling costs from 
surplus region farmgate/wholesale market 
to port-city wholesale market (Tw:s) 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
        
  Marketing and processing costs in the 
surplus region (Ms) 
6 percent of procurement 
price (Pd) 
5 percent of procurement 
price (Pd) 
10 percent of domestic 
wholesale price (Pd) 
10 percent of domestic 
wholesale price (Pd) 
        
  Quality and process level adjustments 
(Qadj) 
No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment 
         








        
Domestic Cost Adjustments  
    Deficit Regions 
   Not  applicable 
        
  Included states  Uttar Pradesh  Uttar Pradesh  Gujarat   
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Table 10 (continued) 
  Cereals and Coarse Grains 
Category Wheat  Rice  Maize  Sorghum 
  Transportation and handling costs from 
surplus to the deficit region (Td:s) 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
 
        
  Marketing and processing costs in the 
deficit region (Md) 
6 percent of procurement 
price (Pd) 
5 percent of procurement 
price (Pd) 
10 percent of domestic 
wholesale price (Pd) 
 
        
  Quality and process level adjustments 
(Qadj) 
No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment 
         








      
Byerlee-Morris  Procedure      
  Domestic  consumption      








        
  Demand  elasticity  -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
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Table 10 (continued) 
  Oilseeds 
Category  Groundnuts  Rapeseed Soybeans Sunflower 
Period  Coverage  (calendar  years) 1985-2002 1985-2002 1985-2002 1987-2002 
      
Trade  Status  Variable  Import Import Import 
      
Reference Domestic Market  Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale 
      
Border  Price      
  •  World price (Pexporterfob)  F.o.b. U.S. converted 
from c.i.f. Rotterdam; 
monthly average of 
groundnut oil and 
groundnut meal price for 
marketing year (October-
September)  
F.o.b. U.S. converted 
from c.i.f. Rotterdam; 
monthly average for 
India’s harvest season 
(January-June) 
F.o.b. U.S. No. 2 yellow 
converted from c.i.f. 
Rotterdam; monthly 
average for India’s 
harvest season (October-
March) 
F.o.b. converted from 
c.i.f. Rotterdam; monthly 
average for marketing 
year (October-
September) 








        
  •  International freight (Ti + Ci)  Assumed to equal 1.6 
times those of wheat 
Assumed to equal 1.6 
times those of wheat 
Assumed to equal 1.6 
times those of wheat 
Assumed to equal 1.6 
times those of wheat 








        
  •  Exchange rate (ER)  Monthly average for 
marketing year  
Monthly average for 
harvest season 
Monthly average for 
harvest season 
Monthly average for 
marketing year 








      
Domestic Cost Adjustments 
      
        
 Included  states  Adhra Pradesh, Gujarat, 
and Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh and 
Rajasthan 
All India only   All India only 
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Table 10 (continued) 
  Oilseeds 
Category  Groundnuts  Rapeseed Soybeans Sunflower 
  Port charges (Cp)  In 1987/88 calculated to 
be Rs. 12 per quintal; 
cost has been projected 
using the port index 
In 1987/88 calculated to 
be Rs. 12 per quintal; 
cost has been projected 
using the port index 
In 1987/88 calculated to 
be Rs. 12 per quintal; 
cost has been projected 
using the port index 
In 1987/88 calculated to 
be Rs. 12 per quintal; 
cost has been projected 
using the port index 
        
  Transportation, handling and marketing 
costs from port to internal wholesale 
market (Td1) 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
        
  Marketing and processing costs from port 
to wholesale (M) 
10 percent of wholesale 
price (Pd) 
6 percent of procurement 
price (Pd) 
6 percent of domestic 
wholesale price (Pd) 
6 percent of domestic 
wholesale price (Pd) 
        
  Transportation and handling costs from 
farm to wholesale market (Td2) 
No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment 
        
  Quality and process level adjustments 
(Qadj) 
No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment 








        
Byerlee-Morris Procedure    Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable 
  Domestic  consumption      
  Source USDA-FAS  PSD 
database, 2004 
   
        
  Demand  elasticity  -0.5     
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Table 10 (continued) 
  Other crops 
Category Sugar  Chickpeas  Cotton   
Period  Coverage  (calendar  years) 1985-2002 1985-2002 1985-2002  
      
Trade  Status  Variable Importable  Variable  
      
Reference  Domestic  Market  Wholesale  Farmgate Farmgate  
      
Border  Price      
  •  World price (Pexporterfob)  F.o.b. Caribbean ports; 
monthly average for 
marketing year (October-
September) and further 
converted into plantation 
white sugar  
Import unit value  F.o.b. U.S. converted 
from c.i.f. Northern 
Europe  
 
   Sources Gulati  Worksheet 
NPC2002.xls 
FAOSTAT   Gulati Worksheet 
NPC2002.xls  
 
        
  •  International freight (Ti + Ci)  The 1989 and 1990 
freight rates from Europe 
to India were provided 
by STC and are 
projected using the 
tramp index. 
Not applicable  U.S.-India freight rate   
   Sources Gulati  Worksheet 
NPC2002.xls 
   
  •  Exchange rate (ER)  Monthly average for 
marketing year. 
Monthly average for 
marketing year. 
Monthly average for 
harvest season. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
  Other crops 
Category Sugar  Chickpeas  Cotton   
Domestic  Cost  Adjustments      
      
  Included states  Uttar Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Tamil 
Nadu 
Haryana, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and 
Uttar Pradesh 
All India only   
        
  Transportation, handling and marketing 
costs from port to internal wholesale 
market (Td1) 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered  
No adjustment  No adjustment   
        
  Transportation and handling costs from 
farm to wholesale market (Td2) 
No adjustment  Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
Computed for 1980/81 
and projected using the 
weighted rail to road 
index, with weights 
depending on the 
distance covered 
 
        
  Marketing and processing costs from 
farm to wholesale (M) 
3 percent of free sale 
sugar price 





        
  Quality and process level adjustments 
(Qadj) 
No adjustment  No adjustment  No adjustment   







Byerlee-Morris  Procedure      
  Domestic consumption    Not applicable  Not applicable   
  Source USDA-FAS  PSD 
database, 2004 
   
        
  Demand  elasticity  -0.5     
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In case of importables, the major consumption region is assumed to be the port 
cities, for example, Mumbai. Reference prices at the border for imported commodities are 
calculated according to equation (3) for the quality level that most closely resembles that 
produced in India.
25 Reference prices at the border for export commodities are taken as 
the export prices of major competitors, Pexporterfob, for an equivalent quality level. This 
represents a departure from equation (4) and implicitly assumes that the international 
freight from the competing exporting country to a third-country importer and from India 
to a third-country importer are equal.  
On the timeframe for annual prices (the full year or harvest season only) we use 
average harvest season prices for India where available. If the large majority of farmers 
sell their products during the harvest season, then seasonal prices are the best indicators 
of the incentives to farmers resulting from the difference between domestic and 
international prices. In cases where we use domestic harvest season prices, international 
prices and exchange rates pertaining to the same timeframe are utilized. We calculate the 
MPS based on all domestic production, rather than marketable surplus, thereby making 
the assumption that producers value all of their production at the domestic price, even if 
some is consumed on-farm.  
Surplus and Deficit Regions 
Farmers in various Indian states receive different levels of protection or 
disprotection from agricultural policy owing to some state-level agricultural policies, and 
the interstate movement restrictions that were in place until 2002. For most of the major 
commodities in India, the Gulati-Pursell data allows representative analysis at the state 
level. Important producing states or regions are divided into “net surplus” and “net 
deficit” areas. In calculating the MPS price gap, the point of comparison between the 
                                                 
25 Given the small trade volumes of the major commodities in India, there is substantial variation between 
import and export unit values and the commonly applied international prices series (i.e. U.S. hard red 
winter wheat f.o.b. U.S. Gulf, U.S. number 2 yellow corn f.o.b. U.S. Gulf, and Thai rice prices f.o.b. 
Bangkok). See Cheng (2004) for comparisons between unit values and international prices. Instead of using 
unit values, we follow Gulati et al. (1990) and, except in the case of chickpeas, select international prices 
for the quality level that is comparable to that produced domestically.      
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imported commodity and the commodity produced in the surplus region is assumed to be 
the wholesale market in the port city, with the adjusted reference price for a “net surplus” 
region under the importable hypothesis given by: 
 
(5)  ( ) ( ) ( ) s s w p i i orterfob ar M T C C T P P
s + − + + + = : exp  
 
where the transportation costs from the port to the port-city wholesale market (Td1) are 
assumed inconsequential, Tw:s is the transportation cost from the surplus region to the 
port-city wholesale market, and Ms is marketing costs in the surplus region. The adjusted 
reference price for a deficit region can then be computed, following the procedure of 
Gulati et al. (1990) and Pursell and Gupta (1996), as either the adjusted reference price 
given by equation (1) for imports coming directly to the deficit region, or as the adjusted 
reference price of a nearby surplus region plus the transportation, handling and marketing 
costs from the surplus region to the deficit region, given by: 
 
    (6)         ( ) d s d ar ar M T P P
s d + + = :  
 
where Td:s is the transportation cost from the surplus to the deficit region and Md is 
marketing costs in the deficit region.  
If the commodity is an export, only surplus regions are included in our analysis. 
In this case the adjusted reference price is: 
 
(7)        ( ) ( ) M T C P P d p orterfob ar + − − = 2 exp  
 
which is essentially equation (2) with Td1 assumed inconsequential and quality of the 
domestic and international commodity assumed to be equivalent. 
Once state-level adjusted reference prices are derived, state-level nominal MPS 
can be computed. These results are then aggregated for the included states and the total 
expanded to an estimate of the national average MPS (see Pursell and Gupta, 1996). A 
national average Pm and Pe can also be computed using the value of production in the  
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included states as the weights. It is the national average import and export adjusted 
reference prices that are compared to a P* estimated at the national level to determine the 
adjusted reference price in application of the MPS modified procedure. 
 
Domestic Market Clearing Prices 
The direction of net trade varies across years for many commodities in India. For 
seven commodities (rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, sugar, groundnuts and cotton), we 
compute and compare the MPS and %MPS under both the assumption that the 
commodities are importables (“importable hypothesis”) and exportables (“exportable 
hypothesis”) to demonstrate the effects of various adjustments. We also compute a 
domestic market-clearing price P
* at the national level for six of these commodities 
(except cotton) and we report MPS and %MPS (labeled “modified procedure”) for which 
the relevant reference price each year is chosen based on whether P
* is above, below, or 
between Pm and Pe , as discussed above. Using these results, PSEs and %PSE can be 
calculated for any of the adjusted reference price assumptions. 
In calculating the annual (post-harvest) domestic market-clearing price, we 
assume that ex post supply is fixed within the year. With supply fixed, computing P
* 
requires additional data on the price elasticity of demand and domestic consumption 
quantity and prices paid. The demand elasticity estimates available in the literature vary 
widely depending on the model and data used, and our calculation of P
* will vary 
depending on the elasticity assumed. Not binding ourselves to any particular estimate, we 
use -0.5 as an illustrative value, as used in Gulati and Kelley (1999).
26 We supplement the 
Gulati and Pursell database with total national domestic consumption for 1985-2003 from 
the USDA-FAS Production, Supply and Demand database (USDA-FAS, 2004d) and use 
the wholesale prices in our dataset to approximate the consumer price.  
                                                 
26 See Dev et al. (2004) for recent discussion of demand being even more inelastic, about -0.2. As a 
sensitivity analysis we also computed results for this more inelastic demand parameter.  
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Input Subsidies 
Aggregate estimates of subsidies on fertilizer, power and irrigation are from 
Gulati and Narayanan (2003) and are trend projected for 2001/02 and 2002/03 (see Table 
6). To calculate commodity-specific PSEs, fertilizer subsidies are allocated across 
commodities based on the commodity’s share of fertilizer usage, while irrigation and 
power subsides are distributed based on the share of irrigated area, as reported in USDA, 
1994 (see Table 11). We have not included seed or credit subsidies in our analysis 
because their values have been small in recent years. 
 
Table 11—Shares of Fertilizer Usage and Irrigated Area by Crop  
  Share of Fertilizer Use 
% 
Share of Irrigated Area 
% 
Wheat  27.65 31.05
Rice  34.72 30.86
Corn  1.23 1.95
Sorghum  2.47 1.24
Chickpea  2.5 2.29









Note: Sunflower share of fertilizer use is estimated by the ratio of rapeseed:sunflower production in  
         1985-2003*rapeseed share of fertilizer use. Soybean and sunflower share of irrigated area is given by  
          the ratio of soybean:sunflower production in 1985-2003*share of irrigated area for "other oilseeds" in  
          worksheet "Irrigated area."  
Sources: USDA 1994 (for irrigation); Indiastat 2003 for fertilizer.  
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5.2   CEREALS  
5.2.1 Wheat 
India is one of the world’s largest producers and consumers of wheat. An MSP 
has been and remains in place at which the government procures wheat, providing a price 
floor for farmers. The effects of the restrictions on domestic wheat movements among 
states and even districts, and the stocking limits on private traders have been to drive 
down the “farm harvest price” to the MSP. Thus, throughout the period of analysis, the 
MSP is treated as the price received by producers.  
Since wheat is a storable commodity, the gap between annual supply and demand 
is absorbed by the sum of net stock accumulation and net exports. Although wheat is 
essentially a non-traded commodity (net trade less than 500,000 tons or less than 1 
percent of domestic production) in over one-third of the years between 1985-2003, there 
is also some variability in net exports and changes in stocks (Figure 10). If supply is 
greater than demand for any given year, stocks are accumulating or the country is a net 
exporter, or both and the reverse if supply is less than demand. Sometimes the trade and 
stock adjustments work in opposite directions: for example, with stocks rising and net 
imports occurring. 
Wheat and other cereal imports have been subject to state trading by the FCI. 
From 1985 to 1994, India imported very little wheat except in two years (1988 and 1992) 
when production fell short of domestic consumption. Wheat exports were restricted until 
1995. The Indian government then moved wheat onto the list of freely exportable goods. 
As exports started to pick up, there was upward pressure on domestic wheat prices and 
the government hastily banned exports in 1996 and opened up imports of wheat at zero 
tariff.
27 Initially very low levels of imports followed since domestic prices were below 
                                                 
27 The motivation behind this policy change reflects an interesting aspect of the political economy of trade 
policy. In particular, the roller flourmills in southern India succeeded in securing the right to import wheat. 
The roller flourmills had always complained about the constraints they face in procuring wheat (grown 
mainly in the northern states). They argue for instance, that the northern industry, which is closer to the 
central government and has better bargaining power gains from discriminatory pricing of the FCI’s open 
market sale of wheat (Business Line, 2001).  
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world prices. But in the following years, especially from 1998 onwards, the world prices 
of wheat and other agricultural commodities fell. In the United States and other 
developed countries cash subsidy payments and other support to farmers were increased, 
allowing exports to continue even with low prices. India imported some wheat in 1998 
and 1999, despite bumper crops harvested in these years. The MSP also continued to rise. 
This led to a situation where imports were coming in even as domestic food grain stocks 
reached unprecedented levels, and wheat stocks built up that could only be exported with 
subsidies because the domestic price was higher than the world price.  
To stem the flow of imports, the GOI raised the import duty from zero to 50 
percent on December 1, 1999, still well within its WTO bound rate of 100 percent. The 
government also started selling wheat stocks to private traders at concessional rates for 
export, as discussed above and estimated to be about 75 percent of the MSP in 2001 
(USDA-FAS, 2002). Under these policies, over the past three years India has emerged as 
a net exporter of low quality wheat, shipping an estimated 5 million tons in 2002-03 to 
South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 
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Price comparisons and annual estimates of the wheat %MPS for 1985 to 2003 are 
shown under several alternative assumptions in Table 12. In our calculations, the MPS is 
computed based on the difference between the MSP for wheat (Pd in Table 12) taken as a 
proxy for domestic farmgate price and the adjusted reference prices. The reference prices 
for exports (Pexporterfob in Table 12) are taken in dollars as the price of U.S. hard red winter 
wheat f.o.b. U.S. Gulf.  Adding the international transportation costs to India from the 
source at U.S. Gulf ports gives Pcif, a dollar reference price for imports. Multiplication of 
these two prices by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in rupees per 
ton for Indian exports and imports, respectively. The unadjusted reference prices are not 
shown in Table 12. Instead the average adjusted reference prices (Pm and Pe) are given, 
following equations (1) and (2), as modified for the state-level analysis (equations (6)-
(8)) and aggregation, and using the other assumptions and adjustments summarized in 
Table 10. Estimates of the national-level market-clearing autarky prices (P
*) are also 
shown. 
Under the importable hypothesis, we computed the wheat MPS for two key 
surplus states (Haryana and Punjab) and one important deficit state (Uttar Pradesh). We 
then aggregate the results to a national level, as described above. Under the exportable 
hypothesis, we compute the wheat MPS by state for Haryana and Punjab and derive our 
national estimate from these results. The national estimates for the %MPS are shown for 
both the importable and exportable hypothesis in Table 12 (these estimates are labelled 
“Adjusted Reference Price”). Table 12 also displays a simplified %MPS based on the 
difference between the MSP and a reference price at the border without internal 
adjustments (c.i.f. under the importable hypothesis and f.o.b. for exportables, labelled 
“Unadjusted Border Price”).   
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Table 12—Wheat Prices, %MPS and PSE Under Various Assumptions, 1985-2003 
 
Note: Relevant Par is in bold (see discussion in text). Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in  
          rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively, which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from  
          those equations (see text for discussion of the adjustments).  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
  1985  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data 
P  exporterfob   (US$/MT)  154  139 116 115 136 174 125 143 146 140  152 192 197 151 121 109 122 128 140
P  cif   (US$/MT)  184  169 141 140 179 215 165 184 188 181  196 235 241 194 163 150 164 169 181
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$)  12.5  12.5 12.8 13.4 16.1 17.3 20.5 25.9 31.3 31.4  31.4 34.7 35.8 40.8 42.9 44.1 46.9 49.0 47.4
P  d   (Rs/MT)  1520  1570 1620 1660 1730 1830 2150 2250 2750 3300  3500 3600 3800 4750 5100 5500 5800 6100 6200
P  m   (Rs/MT)  2200  2009 1693 1771 2795 3608 3261 4654 5760 5537  6017 8061 8509 7747 6853 6482 7538 8125 8414
P  e   (Rs/MT)  1504  1295 995 1007 1607 2352 1832 2908 3652 3340  3614 5459 5767 4676 3624 3146 4023 4459 4721
P 
*   (Rs/MT)  1496  1468 2318 1847 1671 1657 2363 2393 2355 3134  3411 4032 3789 4357 4730 3928 5152 6225 6544
Wheat %MPS Estimates 
Importable Hypothesis 
Adjusted Reference Prices  -31.0  -21.9 -4.3 -6.3 -38.2 -49.3 -34.1 -51.7 -52.3 -40.5  -41.9 -55.4 -55.4 -38.7 -25.6 -15.2 -23.1 -25.0 -26.4
Unadjusted Border Price (c.i.f.)  -33.7  -25.6 -9.9 -11.7 -40.1 -50.9 -36.6 -52.7 -53.3 -41.9  -43.1 -56.0 -55.9 -40.1 -27.1 -17.0 -24.7 -26.5 -27.8
Difference  2.8  3.7 5.5 5.4 1.9 1.6 2.4 1.0 1.0 1.5  1.3 0.6 0.5 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4
Exportable Hypothesis 
Adjusted Reference Prices  1.0  21.2 62.8 64.9 7.7 -22.2 17.4 -22.6 -24.7 -1.2  -3.1 -34.1 -34.1 1.6 40.7 74.8 44.2 36.8 31.3
Unadjusted Border Price (f.o.b.)  -21.0  -9.9 9.6 7.8 -21.2 -39.2 -16.1 -39.4 -40.0 -24.7  -26.5 -46.0 -46.2 -22.9 -2.1 14.9 1.0 -2.5 -6.2
Difference  22.1  31.1 53.2 57.1 28.9 17.1 33.4 16.8 15.3 23.5  23.4 12.0 12.1 24.5 42.8 59.9 43.2 39.3 37.5
Modified Procedure  1.0  7.0 -4.3 -6.3 3.5 -22.2 -9.0 -22.6 -24.7 -1.2  -3.1 -34.1 -34.1 1.6 7.8 40.0 12.6 -2.0 -5.3
Wheat PSE Under Modified Procedure 
MPS (Rs. bil)  0.7  4.8 -3.2 -5.1 3.2 -26.0 -11.7 -36.7 -51.6 -2.4  -7.5 -115.4 -136.4 4.9 26.4 120.0 44.6 -9.2 -23.9
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil)  8.7  10.3 8.4 15.5 21.9 26.2 34.9 36.9 42.0 47.8  68.9 83.5 88.8 96.1 108.2 114.9 126.6 135.8 148.9
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil)  9.4  15.1 5.2 10.3 25.1 0.2 23.2 0.2 -9.6 45.4  61.4 -32.0 -47.6 101.0 134.5 235.0 171.2 126.6 125.1
PSE (%) 
Trade Economist Denominator  14.2  21.9 6.9 12.6 27.8 0.2 17.8 0.1 -4.6 22.7  25.8 -9.4 -11.9 32.6 39.9 78.3 48.3 27.7 27.6
OECD Denominator  12.4  17.9 6.5 11.2 21.7 0.2 15.1 0.1 -4.8 18.5  20.5 -10.4 -13.5 24.6 28.5 43.9 32.6 21.7 21.6 
63 
Under the importable hypothesis, the %MPS results with and without internal 
adjustments are quite similar.
28 There is, however, a greater difference between 
unadjusted reference prices and adjusted Pe under the exportable hypothesis, and thus in 
the respective %MPS. The %MPS results with the adjusted reference price under the 
exportable hypothesis are greater than for the unadjusted reference price by 12.0 percent 
(in 1996) to 59.9 percent (in 2000). Recall that in the specification of Pe for an export Cp, 
Tw:s and M are subtracted from the unadjusted reference price with no offsetting additions. 
In this case, the MPS based on a comparison of domestic prices and unadjusted reference 
prices has a systematic downward bias that can be large when internal adjustments are 
important.  
On the substantive issue of levels of protection or disprotection, we focus on the 
estimates of the %MPS with adjusted reference prices. The results under the exportable 
hypothesis are greater than those under the importable hypothesis because Pe is always 
less than Pm. There are large fluctuations in the %MPS over time, partly being counter-
cyclical to international price movements and partly reflecting changes in the domestic 
support price.  
Generally, the level of protection (disprotection) increases (decreases) when 
world prices are low and decreases (increases) when world prices are high. The %MPS is 
consistently negative under the importable hypothesis but varies from -4.3, -6.3 and -15.2 
percent in 1986, 1987 and 2000, respectively, when world prices were relatively low, to -
55.4 percent when world prices peaked in 1996 and 1997. Under the exportable 
hypothesis, the %MPS has a similar pattern, being highest in 2000 (74.8 percent) when 
the combination of rising support prices and falling world prices increased the level of 
protection, and lowest in 1996 and 1997 (-34.1 percent) when world prices were high. 
Disprotection under the importable hypothesis is less, and wheat is protected 
under the exportable hypothesis during 2001-2003 rather than disprotected in the 1990s. 
                                                 
28 Recall in the specification of Pm for imports Cp is added to the unadjusted reference price, Tw:s and Ms are 
subtracted from Pr for a surplus region and Td:s, and Md are added back to Pars to obtain the adjusted 
reference price for a deficit region. The net adjustment is small when aggregated across regions.  
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We estimate that subsidies required to export wheat (Pd - Pe) briefly reached 75 percent 
in 2000, similar to the estimate by USDA-FAS (2002), and averaged almost 50 percent 
during 2000-2003.  
The relevant adjusted reference prices under our modified procedure are shown in 
bold in Table 12 (to recall, when P
*>Pm, then Pm is the relevant Par; when Pe>P
*, then Pe 
is the relevant Par; and when Pm>P
*>Pe, then P
* is the relevant Par). The %MPS is shown 
in Table 12 and the movements of the %MPS under this modified procedure compared 
with those under the importable and exportable hypotheses are shown in Figure 11. 
Under the modified procedure, the relevant reference price varies across years. The 
relevant Par is P
* in 1986, 1989 and 1991, Pm in 1987 and 1988, and Pe in 1985 and 1990. 
In these various years, if the policy interventions were removed, wheat, in principle, 
would have been not traded, imported and exported, respectively. By 1990, the domestic 
price, Pd was below the relevant Par and %MPS was negative (-22.2 percent in 1990 and -
9.0 percent in 1991). During 1992-1998, Pe is the relevant Par, meaning that without 
policy interventions, India would have been an exporter in these years. Because the 
%MPS is negative in all of these years except 1998, producers were disprotected relative 
to Pe. Part of the rise in disprotection resulted from relatively strong world prices during 
this period and part from a nominal depreciation of the Indian currency of 80 percent 
between 1990 and 1993 (depreciation raises the adjusted reference price in domestic 
currency).
29  
During 1999-2003, we estimate that P
* is the relevant reference price for wheat in 
India, implying that without policy interventions India would be self-sufficient in wheat 
production, but would not import or export (or experience changes in intervention stock 
levels). This is because Pm is “too high” for imports to be competitive and Pe is “too low” 
relative to P
* for exports to be profitable in the world market. The %MPS from the 
                                                 
29 Currency misalignment and its effects on the MPS and PSE for India and China are evaluated by Cheng 
and Orden (2005). Overall, they find the Indian currency was overvalued about 15 percent through 1993 
compared to estimated equilibrium levels. For wheat, the overvaluation lower %MPS by an average of -4.1 
percent in 1985-89 and -4.7 percent during 1991-93. With the substantial nominal devaluation, the 
exchange rate has since moved closer to the equilibrium.      
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modified procedure reaches a high of 40.0 percent in 2000. The estimated level of 
protection is less than under the conventional exportable assumption. In 2002 and 2003, 
the domestic price is slightly below P
*, corresponding to decreasing stocks, and resulting 
in a small negative %MPS in these years, compared to positive support under the export 
hypothesis and a continued need for export subsidies given actual domestic and world 
prices.  
 
Figure 11—India Wheat %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable 
























































































Source:  Authors’ calculations.  
Note:  MPSm, MPSe and MPSmp are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and the  
           modified procedure, respectively. 
Wheat PSEs 
To calculate the product-specific %PSE for wheat, we take the MPS based on the 
choice of autarky or adjusted import or export reference price under our modified 
procedure as our estimate for each year and compute the nominal MPS value for total 
wheat production (see Table 12).
30 To the MPS, we add the budgetary payments allocated 
to wheat producers, which include 27.65 percent of the total fertilizer subsidies and 31.05 
                                                 
30 Results under the importable and exportable hypotheses are available on request.  
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percent of the power and irrigation subsidies (see Table 11). Adding the nominal MPS for 
wheat and the budgetary payments allocated to wheat gives the nominal wheat PSE.  
In Table 12, we have computed the wheat %PSE under both the OECD and “trade 
economists” approaches to choosing the denominator. The %PSE according to the trade 
economist’s approach is always greater than the OECD or subsidy counter’s approach 
(labeled “OECD Denominator” in Table 1) when the PSE is positive and smaller (in 
absolute value) when the PSE is negative. These results follow from the relationship 
between the two denominators.
31 The difference in the case of wheat in India is often 
small and mostly less than 10 percent. An exception is when the MPS is a large positive 
number. For example, in 2000, the %PSE under the trade economist’s approach is 78.3 
percent, compared to 43.9 percent under the subsidy counter’s approach, a difference of 
34.4 percent. 
5.2.2 Rice 
India is the world’s second largest producer, consumer and exporter of rice.  
Exports of common rice from India were essentially banned until 1994 but recently India 
has become a major supplier of common as well as basmati rice, exporting 4 MMT in 
2002 (Figure 12).  The government actively intervenes in the rice market through price 
support and procurement operations, and since April 2001, also through export subsidies, 
estimated at 50 percent of procurement prices (Wailes, 2003).   
In addition to the purchase operations for extending price support to farmers for 
paddy rice, the FCI also procures rice under the statutory levy system imposed under the 
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 whereby state governments require millers and dealers 
to deliver from 10 to 75 percent of their turnover at prices announced separately for each 
state (Hoda and Gulati, 2005). As discussed above, support prices for food grains have 
increased steadily since 1996 resulting in accumulation of large stocks. In terms of 
                                                 
31 The value of production at domestic prices is its value at adjusted reference prices plus the nominal MPS. 
The subsidy counter denominator is larger when product-specific PSE is positive because (MPS + BP) for 
the commodity is greater than zero. Conversely, when the product-specific PSE is negative, the subsidy 
counter denominator is smaller in absolute value because (MPS + BP) is less than zero.  
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possible imports, in 2002-03 the applied tariff on milled rice was 70 percent, while that 
on paddy, brown rice and broken rice was 80 percent. 
For rice, we compute the MPS for two major producing and net surplus states 
(Andhra Pradesh and Punjab) and one major producing but net deficit state (Uttar 
Pradesh) under the importable hypothesis (Table 13). Under the exportable hypothesis, 
we compute the MPS for Andhra Pradesh and Punjab. The export price, Pexporterfob, is for 
Thai 15 percent broken rice during the peak paddy harvest season in India (October to 
January), Pd is the weighted average procurement price (wholesale level) of rice in the 
three states, and price adjustments are as described in Table 10. For rice and subsequent 
commodities under the importable and exportable hypotheses only the results with the 
adjusted reference price are reported.
32 





















































































Change in Stocks Net Exports Total
 
 
Source: USDA-FAS PSD database, February 2004. 
 
                                                 
32 The results for the unadjusted border prices are available upon request, but having demonstrated that the 
internal adjustments are important for wheat, especially under the exportable hypothesis, we do not 
continue to show the comparison for other crops.  
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The %MPS results in Table 13 and Figure 13 show that except in the mid 1980s 
and in 2000-2002 rice has been disprotected in India. Under our modified procedure, Pe 
is the relevant adjusted reference price from 1988 through 2000, meaning that if policy 
interventions were removed India would have been a net exporter of rice. Following the 
removal of the ban on rice exports in 1994, India’s exports of rice went up from less than 
1 million to about 5 million tons in 1995-96, making India the second largest exporter of 
rice in that year. Domestic prices in India were lower than the reigning international 
prices both during the period of the export ban and when world prices peaked in 1995-
1997. However, with the international prices falling in the late 1990s, domestic prices 
were comparable to the international prices and India’s rice exports turned sluggish. 
Although the MPS remains negative under the importable hypothesis, the MPS estimated 
under the export hypothesis or modified procedure turn mostly positive, implying that 
domestic prices are higher than the relevant adjusted reference prices in 2000-2002. 
Because the domestic price has been greater than the adjusted international price for 
exports in 2000-2002, the government has had to grant export subsidies on rice in recent 
years in order to continue shipments abroad. Our estimates of the necessary export 
subsidies are in the order of 35-40 percent in 2001 and 2002. 
The PSEs for rice are also given in Table 13, again using the reference prices 
from the modified procedure, and allocating 34.72 percent of the total fertilizer subsidies 
and 30.86 percent of the irrigation and power subsidies to rice in accord with its share of 
fertilizer use and irrigated area. The PSE estimates broadly follow the same pattern and 
sign as the MPS. In recent years, increasing input subsidies have raised the %PSE 
compared to the %MPS.  
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Table 13—Rice Prices, %MPS and PSE Under Various Assumptions, 1985-2002 
 
Note: Relevant Par is in bold (see discussion in text). Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in  
          rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively, which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from  
          those equations (see text for discussion of the adjustments).  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT) 209 200 159 254 258 256 254 254 237 278 254 346 304 255 272 216 174 173
Pcif (US$/MT) 228 220 175 271 286 284 281 281 264 306 284 375 333 284 300 244 202 201
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 12.3 12.1 13.0 13.0 15.0 16.9 18.1 25.9 26.0 31.4 31.4 35.0 35.8 38.0 42.4 43.5 46.6 48.1
Pd (Rs/MT) 2245 2320 2386 2239 2613 3005 3375 3861 4515 5162 5665 6057 6745 7734 8418 8780 8535 8494
Pm (Rs/MT) 2726 2586 2199 3453 4234 4714 5013 7179 6786 9456 8763 13006 11815 10699 12659 10507 9353 9580
Pe (Rs/MT) 2206 2051 1656 2879 3381 3777 3996 5858 5339 7809 6955 11020 9708 8349 10118 7873 6597 6724
P
* (Rs/MT) 2515 2030 2285 2841 2659 2965 3402 3920 4890 4721 5250 6689 6017 7471 7724 5578 9020 7059
Rice %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis -17.7 -10.3 8.5 -35.2 -38.3 -36.3 -32.7 -46.2 -33.5 -45.4 -35.4 -53.4 -42.9 -27.7 -33.5 -16.4 -8.7 -11.3
Exportable Hypothesis 3.7 15.4 46.9 -22.2 -21.0 -18.8 -14.4 -33.2 -14.2 -32.8 -17.6 -44.8 -28.9 -4.0 -14.9 19.5 39.2 35.6
Modified Procedure -10.8 15.4 8.5 -22.2 -21.0 -18.8 -14.4 -33.2 -14.2 -32.8 -17.6 -44.8 -28.9 -4.0 -14.9 19.5 -5.4 20.3
Rice PSE Under Modified Procedure
MPS (Rs. bil) -15.8 17.2 11.3 -36.4 -54.2 -56.8 -46.2 -149.1 -60.1 -212.6 -105.5 -382.0 -242.2 -50.7 -146.3 81.4 -41.1 130.3
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 9.5 11.3 8.3 15.7 23.1 28.1 38.0 39.2 44.1 49.9 74.2 90.0 95.2 101.4 113.5 118.7 131.1 139.9
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) -6.3 28.5 19.7 -20.6 -31.0 -28.7 -8.1 -109.9 -15.9 -162.7 -31.3 -292.0 -147.0 50.6 -32.8 200.1 85.5 256.9
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator -4.3 21.7 14.8 -12.6 -13.0 -10.3 -2.7 -25.1 -4.1 -25.9 -5.5 -34.4 -18.5 7.3 -3.8 28.3 11.2 40.1
OECD Denominator -4.5 17.9 12.9 -14.4 -15.0 -11.5 -2.8 -33.6 -4.3 -35.0 -5.8 -52.5 -22.7 6.8 -3.9 22.1 10.0 28.6 
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Figure 13—Rice %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable and 





















































































Note: MPSm, MPSe and MPScc are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and the  
          modified procedure, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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5.3 COARSE  GRAINS 
India is an important producer and consumer of coarse grains with an annual crop 
of around 25-35 MMT. Corn production makes up roughly 40 percent of coarse grain 
production, with sorghum and millet contributing 25 percent each and barley makes up 
about 5 percent. Coarse grains are typically planted in non-irrigated and marginal areas 
during the monsoon season, thus production can be highly variable depending on rainfall 
(USDA-FAS, 2004b). A large portion of coarse grain production, particularly of sorghum 
and millet goes to food use. Trade in coarse grains is small for India, less than 1 percent 
of domestic production (see Figures 14 and 15 for net exports of corn and sorghum).  
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Change in Stocks Net Exports Total
 
Source: USDA-FAS PSD database, April 2004. 
 
5.3.1 Corn 
Since 1999, India has produced and consumed around 11-13 MMT of corn 
annually, which makes India a relatively small producer, consumer and trader of corn in 
the world market. Although there is a minimum support price for corn, procurement is 
infrequent.
33 In the early 1990s, the feed industry pressured the GOI to liberalize imports 
to supply the expanding livestock sector, particularly the poultry sector which is among 
the fastest growing sectors in Indian agriculture (Narayanan and Gulati, 2003a). Under 
the EXIM policy of 1992-97, the feed industry was permitted to import maize without 
license based on actual usage and subject to registration.  Imports of maize for other uses 
                                                 
33 In 2000 and 2001, bumper crops of maize in the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka 
brought down domestic prices.  The governments of these two states responded by procuring in excess of 
2.8 million tons of maize in November 2000 through March 2001 (Narayanan and Gulati, 2003a).   
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continued to be routed through parastatals, though imports were insignificant until 1998 
when over 200,000 tons came in.   
Quantitative trade restrictions on maize were abolished in 1999 and India 
established a TRQ with an initial limit of 350,000 tons permitted at an in-quota tariff rate 
of 15 percent. Exports of maize were subject to quantitative ceilings set by the 
government until 2002. Corn imports exceeded 100,000 metric tons in only four years 
since 1985 and India was a net exporter of over 100,000 metric tons of corn in 2003.  
We compute the MPS under the importable and exportable hypotheses and the 
modified procedure using four net surplus states (Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Karnataka, 
and Madhya Pradesh) and (except under the exportable hypothesis) one net deficit state 
(Gujarat). The domestic price, Pd is the weighted average October to January wholesale 
market price in each of the states and Pexporterfob is the export price of U.S. number 2 
yellow corn for the same months. With the limited trade in corn, we find that P
* is the 
relevant adjusted reference price under our modified procedure in 11 out of 18 years 
1985-2002 (see Table 14 and Figure 16). Generally, the %MPS is relatively low for corn, 
with either slight protection or disprotection. Corn is estimated to be protected in 1987-88 
when world prices were low, while disprotection peaks in 1994 at -20.2 percent. Similar 
to wheat, P
* is the relevant adjusted reference price for corn in 1999-2002, during which 
time India’s corn %MPS is in the range of 2.0 percent to 5.8 percent.  
To compute the PSE, we add the MPS under the modified procedure and the 
budgetary payments (Table 14). The budgetary payments allocated to corn production are 
relatively small (1.23 percent of the total fertilizer subsidies and 1.95 percent of the total 
irrigation and power subsidies), yet the MPS and PSE differ in sign in 1991, 1992 and 
1998 when the %MPS is slightly negative and the addition of positive budgetary 
payments makes the PSE positive.   
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Table 14—Corn Prices, %MPS and PSE Under Various Assumptions, 1985-2002 
 
 
Note: Relevant Par is in bold (see discussion in text). Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in  
          rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively, which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from  
          those equations (see text for discussion of the adjustments).   
Source: Authors’ calculations.   
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT) 118 105 70 83 118 108 102 108 94 118 100 148 121 121 97 88 92 90
Pcif (US$/MT) 148 135 96 109 161 150 143 149 137 160 145 192 165 165 139 130 134 132
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 12.3 12.1 13.0 13.0 15.0 16.9 18.1 25.9 26.0 31.4 31.4 35.0 35.8 35.8 42.4 43.5 46.6 48.1
Pd (Rs/MT) 1329 1689 1775 1999 2023 1862 2214 3646 2720 2803 4172 4023 4455 3898 4803 5365 4995 4942
Pm (Rs/MT) 1676 1488 1225 1277 2271 2364 2386 3655 3354 4750 4370 6378 5629 5841 5641 5520 6216 6151
Pe (Rs/MT) 1260 1035 697 881 1550 1639 1604 2575 2240 3513 2825 4766 4012 4220 3999 3004 3530 3547
P
* (Rs/MT) 1327 1880 1733 2183 1998 1784 2358 3732 2707 2782 4160 3988 4052 3987 4541 5213 4895 4843
Corn %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis -20.8 13.6 46.9 57.3 -10.9 -21.3 -7.2 -0.2 -18.9 -41.6 -4.6 -37.1 -20.9 -33.4 -14.9 -2.8 -19.7 -19.7
Exportable Hypothesis 5.4 62.1 154.1 126.1 30.8 13.1 37.8 42.6 21.0 -20.8 46.2 -16.2 10.3 -7.6 20.5 77.6 35.8 40.5
Modified Procedure 0.1 13.6 46.9 57.3 1.3 4.4 -6.1 -0.2 0.5 -20.8 0.3 -16.2 9.9 -7.6 5.8 2.9 2.0 2.0
Corn PSE Under Modified Procedure
MPS (Rs. bil) 0.0 1.3 4.2 4.1 0.2 0.8 -1.3 -0.1 0.1 -6.8 0.1 -7.1 4.3 -3.5 2.9 1.7 1.2 1.3
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.9 4.8 5.1 5.6 6.4 6.9 7.6 8.2
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) 0.5 1.9 4.7 5.1 1.5 2.3 0.7 2.1 2.6 -4.0 4.0 -2.3 9.4 2.1 9.3 8.6 8.8 9.5
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator 4.4 19.3 50.7 69.5 9.0 13.1 3.2 7.0 9.7 -11.8 10.9 -5.1 21.6 4.7 18.4 14.4 14.9 14.9
OECD Denominator 4.2 16.2 33.6 41.0 8.3 11.6 3.1 6.6 8.8 -13.4 9.8 -5.4 17.8 4.4 15.5 12.6 13.0 12.9 
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Figure 16—Corn %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable and 
























































































Note: MPSm, MPSe and MPScc are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and  
          the modified procedure, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
5.3.2 Sorghum 
  India ranks among the top three sorghum producing and consuming countries 
with output of 7-8 MMT. Food use accounts for nearly 90 percent of total sorghum 
consumption in 1985-2003 (USDA-FAS, 2004b).
34 Sorghum is essentially not traded in 
most years and trade was less than 100,000 tons in every year over the period 1985-2003 
(Figure 15). Grain sorghum imports are subject to an 80 percent duty and are restricted to 
the FCI. There is a MSP for sorghum, however it is generally below the market price. 
  We have computed the MPS and PSE for sorghum under the importable, 
exportable and modified hypotheses for four major producing states (Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh). Pd is the weighted average harvest season 
(October-January) wholesale price in the four states and Pexporterfob is the October-January 
average price of sorghum, f.o.b. U.S. Gulf. Table 15 and Figure 17 give the %MPS for 
sorghum. 
                                                 
34 The high tannin content of India’s sorghum restricts is use in poultry rations, but its use in production of 
starch and alcohol is increasing (FAS, 2004).  
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Note: Relevant Par is in bold (see discussion in text). Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in  
          rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively, which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from  
          those equations (see text for discussion of the adjustments). 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT) 108 95 70 77 107 103 101 108 94 114 98 147 108 112 90 82 97 95
Pcif (US$/MT) 138 125 95 103 151 145 142 149 136 156 143 191 152 156 133 124 139 138
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 12.3 12.1 13.0 13.0 15.0 16.9 18.1 25.9 26.0 31.4 31.4 35.0 35.8 38.0 42.4 43.5 46.6 48.1
Pd (Rs/MT) 1743 1911 2030 2130 2765 2838 2555 3008 3026 2679 3632 4893 4932 5180 7429 7889 5965 5326
Pm (Rs/MT) 1704 1520 1239 1356 2243 2520 2608 3800 3532 4897 4476 6631 5396 6020 5915 5522 6666 6864
Pe (Rs/MT) 1111 920 655 731 1235 1413 1424 2212 1826 2900 2302 4252 2912 3369 3029 2553 3507 3591
P
* (Rs/MT) 1407 1433 2162 1229 3872 2244 473 5060 2522 1532 4047 6294 1619 6562 8151 5918 6798 3672
Sorghum %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis 2.3 25.8 63.8 57.2 23.3 12.6 -2.0 -20.8 -14.3 -45.3 -18.9 -26.2 -8.6 -14.0 25.6 42.9 -10.5 -22.4
Exportable Hypothesis 58.1 110.8 219.8 192.7 123.8 102.4 80.2 35.7 65.6 -7.9 56.8 14.5 67.7 54.4 149.3 212.2 70.7 49.2
Modified Procedure 23.9 33.4 63.8 73.3 23.3 26.4 80.2 -20.8 20.0 -7.9 -10.3 -22.3 67.7 -14.0 25.6 42.9 -10.5 45.0
Sorghum PSE Under Modified Procedure
MPS (Rs. bil) 3.8 4.9 7.3 11.0 5.3 7.7 13.2 -6.4 6.5 -2.5 -3.7 -13.1 22.1 -6.3 12.7 20.5 -5.4 13.7
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.4 3.8 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.4 6.0 6.3 6.9
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) 4.3 5.5 7.6 11.7 6.5 9.1 15.2 -4.5 8.6 -0.2 0.1 -8.4 26.9 -1.4 18.2 26.0 0.6 20.0
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator 27.1 37.5 66.7 77.9 28.3 31.4 91.6 -14.5 26.6 -0.5 0.3 -14.3 84.7 -3.0 36.6 54.2 1.2 65.9
OECD Denominator 21.3 27.3 40.0 43.8 22.0 23.9 47.8 -17.0 21.0 -0.5 0.3 -16.7 45.8 -3.1 26.8 35.1 1.2 39.7 
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The results show that the domestic autarky price under our modified procedure 
fluctuates relative to world prices, mostly with P* above Pe but varying in relation to Pm 
(P*  is the relevant adjusted reference price in eight years and Pm in seven years). 
Sorghum is often relatively more protected compared to corn. Also we observe a counter-
cyclical pattern similar to wheat, rice and corn. The %MPS is positive and particularly 
high in the late 1980s as world prices fell to low levels and domestic prices rose in 
response a drought-reduced supply. Then, the %MPS turns slightly negative during the 
mid 1990s when world prices peaked. As world prices dropped again in the late 1990s, 
the %MPS turns positive but is somewhat instable among years. Only an estimated 6 
percent of sorghum area is irrigated (USDA-FAS, 2004b). To compute the sorghum-
specific PSE, we assumed that sorghum accounts for 2.47 percent of total fertilizer use 
and 1.24 percent of total power and irrigation usage, and allocate the input subsidies 
accordingly.  
Figure 17—Sorghum %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable and 
























































































Note: MPSm, MPSe and MPScc are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and the 
modified procedure, respectively.   
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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5.4 SUGAR 
  India, followed by the EU and Brazil, is the world’s largest sugar producer, 
accounting for about 15 percent of world production in 1999-2003. India is also the 
largest sugar consuming country, with domestic consumption averaging 19.4 MMT (in 
raw sugar equivalents) during this period (USDA-FAS, 2004d). India is not among the 
major sugar net importing or exporting countries, but four consecutive years of record 
production resulted in India being a net exporter of more than one million tons annually 
during the period 2000-2003 (Figure 18). This amount is a relatively small proportion of 
the 35-45 MMT of annual world trade, but still represents an important reversal from 
India’s net importer status previously.  
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Sugar is included under the Essential Commodities Act of 1955, and its marketing 
and distribution by state and private mills are highly regulated. Since interventions in the 
sugar market were introduced in 1951, the goals of the policy regime has been to regulate 
prices received by producers and ensure that specified quantities of sugar are available 
for distribution to consumers at low controlled prices (Pursell and Gupta, 1996). The 
current domestic sugar market policies encompass cane and processed sugar pricing rules 
and controls on sugar market releases.
35 
  For sugar, the GOI establishes “statutory minimum prices” (SMPs) for each 
region and the state governments often augment the SMPs by an additional 20 to 30 
percent, except in recent years (FAS, 2004). Sugar mills are obliged to pay producers the 
effective state advised price (SAP) for sugarcane, which has been increasing in recent 
years. This has raised India’s cost of sugar production to an estimated US$270 to US$280 
per ton, compared to an average of US$172 for sugar production in the major low cost 
producing countries (USDA-FAS, 2004c; Mitchell, 2004).
36         
  The government also regulates the release of sugar from mills. Mills are required 
to sell a portion of their production, known as “levy sugar” to the government at less than 
market prices. The government then sells this sugar to consumers below the poverty line 
through the Public Distribution System (PDS). The levy price of sugar is determined 
based on the SMP in each region, sugar recovery rates, and costs. Since mills typically 
have to pay farmers the SAP, which can be greater than the SMP on a raw sugar 
                                                 
35 Other government policies affecting sugar markets include a new ethanol production program, launched 
in January 2003, and a Sugar Development Fund (SDF). Recently, the SDF, supported by a levy of Rs. 140 
per ton of sugar, has been used to pay for maintenance of buffer stocks, internal and international freight 
subsidies for exports of sugar, and loans at concessional interest rates for power generation and ethanol 
production facilities, as well as for research and extension directed at sugarcane and sugar production 
(USDA-FAS, 2004c). The central government has also recently announced Rs. 32.4 billion (US$706 
million) in low interest loans to selected state governments to enable sugar mills to pay farmers the 
difference between the SAP and SMP (USDA-FAS, 2004c). 
36 Some private sugar mills refused to purchase cane at the SMP at the start of the 2002/03 
(October/September) marketing year and filed a case in the Supreme Court of India against the state 
governments’ policy of arbitrarily fixing the SAP. In an interim ruling, the court ordered the mills to pay 
the central government announced SMP until a final decision is taken (USDA-FAS, 2004c). State-owned 
mills continue to pay the SAP, although their payment backlogs to farmers are up to two to three times 
greater than those of the private mills (USDA-FAS, 2004c).  
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equivalent basis, sales at the levy price represent a loss to the mills that they are supposed 
to recoup from the sale of “free sugar” at market prices (Pursell and Gupta, 1996). Figure 
19 shows the average levy and free market price, and the “free sale ratio” quantities sold 
at each price for the three large producing states of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and 
Tamil Nadu during 1985-2002. The proportion of free sale sugar has increased over time. 
The government also levies an excise tax on free sale sugar and operates a quarterly sales 
quota release program that restricts free sugar marketing.
37 

































































































Source: Gulati and Pursell database. 
 
India’s sugar imports and exports are also highly regulated. There is an import 
duty of 60 percent plus a countervailing duty (CVD) of Rs. 850 per ton on raw and 
refined sugar. Imported sugar is also subject to the levy sugar obligation, the sugar 
release quota system, and other domestic regulations (USDA-FAS, 2004c). 
                                                 
37 Before 2002, the marketing quotas were operated on a monthly basis.  
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  To encourage the sugar exports, the GOI recently has offered incentives to 
exporters including an internal freight subsidy of up to Rs. 1000 per ton to cover freight 
costs from the mill to port that began in July 2002. In February 2003, an ocean freight 
subsidy of Rs. 350 per ton was offered and beginning in October 2003, the government 
reimbursed handling and marketing costs up to Rs. 500 per ton. Exports are also exempt 
from levy requirements, release quotas, local taxes cess, and other domestic regulations. 
State governments also provide export subsidies. For example, Maharashtra provides an 
export subsidy of Rs. 2500 per ton to their sugar mills (USDA-FAS, 2004c). 
  The MPS and PSE measures for sugar in India are computed using the three major 
producing states. World prices, international freight, and internal transport and marketing 
costs are handled in similar ways to the other commodities (Table 10). However, due to 
the complex sugar pricing policies the domestic price is the weighted average of the free 
sale sugar price and the levy sugar price, where the weights reflect the proportion of free 
sale to levy sugar mandated by the government. The free sale sugar price (quoted in the 
nearest major city) is adjusted by deducting marketing and traders’ margins between the 
mill and major city, excise taxes and cess to give the price actually received by the mills 
(Pursell and Gupta, 1996).  
  Table 16 and Figure 20 present the %MPS results for sugar. Large fluctuations in 
the %MPS calculations over 1985-2002 are primarily due to swings in the adjusted 
reference price of sugar. The estimates suggest that sugar is highly protected in the late 
1980s, becomes slightly disprotected in the early to mid 1990s and reverses to increasing 
levels of protection in the late 1990s. From 1997-2002, the estimated %MPS is positive. 
Since India was a net exporter in 1997 and again in 2001-2004, our analysis suggests that 
export subsidies on the order of 35-85 percent were necessary to make Indian sugar 
competitive on the world market. This is consistent with the FAS cost comparisons and 
the policy setting in which internal and international freight subsidies, and additional 
concessions on sugar exports were given in recent years.     
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Table 16—Sugar Prices, %MPS and PSE Under Various Assumptions, 1985-2002 
 
Note: Relevant Par is in bold (see discussion in text). Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in  
          rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively, which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from  
          those equations (see text for discussion of the adjustments). 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
  1985  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data 
P  exporterfob   (US$/MT)  142  182 185 245 343 395 297 275 270 318  390 301 276 250 177 190 237 181
P  cif   (US$/MT)  153  191 197 262 359 411 313 290 288 332  406 316 291 265 193 206 252 196
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$)  12.4  12.4 13.0 13.4 15.7 17.2 20.8 25.9 29.1 31.4  31.6 35.2 35.9 40.1 42.8 44.1 46.8 48.5
P  d   (Rs/MT)  4002  4456 4570 5025 5581 6086 6205 6643 7930 10116  9590 10341 11186 11993 11971 12474 13135 13137
P  m   (Rs/MT)  1902  2364 2541 3517 5678 7114 6530 7534 8429 10449  12927 11242 10538 10761 8476 9318 12049 9725
P  e   (Rs/MT)  1484  1949 2047 2906 4959 6329 5639 6473 7145 9172  11477 9643 8831 8908 6421 7194 9828 7419
P 
*   (Rs/MT)  6612  6782 6205 6665 8199 6663 6483 6206 11597 16035  8479 8065 15166 17515 13996 11170 12155 15078
Sugar %MPS Estimates 
Importable Hypothesis  110.5  88.5 79.8 42.9 -1.7 -14.5 -5.0 -11.8 -5.9 -3.2  -25.8 -8.0 6.1 11.5 41.2 33.9 9.0 35.1
Exportable Hypothesis  169.6  128.6 123.2 72.9 12.5 -3.8 10.0 2.6 11.0 10.3  -16.4 7.2 26.7 34.6 86.4 73.4 33.6 77.1
Modified Procedure  110.5  88.5 79.8 42.9 -1.7 -8.7 -4.3 2.6 -5.9 -3.2  -16.4 7.2 6.1 11.5 41.2 33.9 9.0 35.1
Sugar PSE Under Modified Procedure 
MPS (Rs. bil)  12.9  14.7 17.2 13.7 -0.8 -6.3 -3.3 2.3 -5.3 -3.3  -27.6 11.5 8.4 15.8 54.3 57.4 20.1 62.4
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil)  1.8  2.1 1.4 2.7 4.1 5.1 7.0 7.0 7.8 8.8  13.5 16.4 17.2 18.1 20.1 20.7 22.9 24.4
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil)  14.7  16.8 18.6 16.5 3.3 -1.2 3.6 9.3 2.5 5.5  -14.2 27.8 25.6 33.9 74.4 78.2 43.0 86.8
PSE (%) 
Trade Economist Denominator  125.5  101.0 86.3 51.4 6.6 -1.7 4.6 10.7 2.8 5.4  -8.4 17.5 18.8 24.5 56.5 46.1 19.3 48.8
OECD Denominator  55.7  50.3 46.3 33.9 6.2 -1.7 4.4 9.7 2.7 5.1  -9.2 14.9 15.8 19.7 36.1 31.6 16.2 32.8 
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Turning to the %PSE, we capture the additional impact of the fertilizer, power 
and irrigation subsidies on the sugar sector. About 85 percent of the total sugarcane area 
is irrigated and sugarcane uses large quantities of power as well (Pursell and Gupta, 
1996). We estimate that sugarcane production accounts for 7.12 percent of the total 
fertilizer usage and 5.18 percent of the total irrigated area in India.  
The trade economist’s %PSE exceeds the %MPS by an average of 10.5 
percentage points. As with other commodities, when protection or disprotection is 
relatively large, the differences between the %PSE with the trade economist and OECD 
denominators are large, for example during 1985-87 the two %PSEs average 104.3 and 
50.8 percent, respectively. But the differences between these two support measures are 
not as large in recent years when sugar has been protected.   
 
Figure 20—Sugar %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable and 
























































































 Note:  MPSm, MPSe and MPScc are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and  
                     the modified procedure, respectively. 
              Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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5.5 OILSEEDS 
India is the fifth largest producer of oilseeds, producing around 20-25 MMT 
annually.  Domestic production of 6-7 MMT of edible oils in recent years is less than 
domestic demand of around 10 MMT, and thus imports of 4 MMT have been necessary 
(GOI, 2003). The composition of India’s edible oil consumption has shifted away from 
groundnut (peanut) and rapeseed oils, which accounted for 53 percent and 25 percent of 
consumption in the early 1970s, to greater consumption of palm and soybean oils. In 
2003, palm and soybean oils made up 34 percent and 16 percent, respectively of oil 
consumption (Figure 21).  



















Note: Total consumption is 11.4 MMT. 
 
Edible oils are India’s biggest agricultural import. Palm products constituted over 
70 percent of the total edible oil imports in 2003 followed by soybean oil which accounts 
for about one-quarter (Figure 22). The rising consumption of palm and soybean oils in  
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recent years is due to a greater access for imports and an increased domestic production 
of soybeans (Dohlman et al., 2003). India exports small amounts of sesame and niger 
seed. The exports of Hand Picked Select (HPS) peanuts average around 100,000 tons.  
India is a large exporter of oilseed cake since its domestic demand as a livestock feed is 
limited. Soybean meal was India’s sixth largest agricultural export by value in 2002 and 
India was the seventh largest soybean meal exporter in the world that year (Table 2).   






















































































Palm Soybean Rapeseed Sunflower
 
Source: USDA-FAS PSD database, April 2004. 
 
Starting in 1986, India began to pursue an import substitution strategy in the 
oilseed sector. Import restrictions accorded a high level of protection to edible oils and 
oilseeds. As a result, domestic oilseed production grew from 10 MMT in 1980 to 21 
MMT by 1993.  Though India imported some edible oils during the 1980s, this was 
tightly controlled through canalization (State Trading Corporation and the Hindustan 
Vegetable Oil Corporation). Imports of oilseeds, also canalized, were practically non-
existent. By the early 1990s, India had achieved near self-sufficiency in edible oils but  
86 
domestic prices were about 60 percent higher than world prices (Pursell and Gulati, 
1995).  
Import policy reforms were undertaken in the oilseed sector in 1994. The 
government freed imports of major edible oils (palmolein first, others a year later with 
the notable exception of coconut oil) and started reducing import duties over successive 
years. Tariffs fell from 65 percent in 1994 to 30 percent, then to 20 percent, and finally to 
15 percent on crude edible oils by December 1999, against WTO bound rates of 45 
percent for crude and refined soybean oil and 300 percent for other edible oils.
38  
As world prices fell in the late 1990s, there was a surge in imports exceeding 5 
MMT per annum in 1999-2003 (Figure 22).  India’s self-sufficiency in oils dropped from 
97 percent in 1993 to 55 percent in 2001.  In the face of ensuing political pressure from 
the domestic vegetable oil industry, the GOI began to increase the import duty on edible 
oils in 2000 and to set more differentiated rates among them through a tariff rate value 
(TRV) system (Dohlman et al., 2003). By August 2001, the basic tariff rates stood at 30 
percent for oilseeds and oilmeals, 75 percent for crude edible oils not subject to the TRV 
system, and 85 percent for refined sunflower-safflower oil and refined rapeseed oil 
(USDA-FAS, 2003d).  Importantly, the imports of oil seeds are restricted through 
phytosanitary and import licensing procedures, and imports in most years are negligible 
(USDA-FAS, 2003d).   
Domestic processing of India’s two main oilseeds (groundnut and mustard) is 
reserved for small-scale industries. Thus, a noteworthy feature of India’s domestic 
oilseed policy is that protection is targeted at the small-scale oil crushers rather than 
oilseed farmers. Gulati and Kelley (1999) find oil processors are relatively less efficient 
than oilseed farmers because oil processors are unable to take advantage of economies of 
scale.  
                                                 
38 Rapeseed and sunflower-safflower oils which were subject to TRQs and  over-quota duties of 75 percent 
and 85 percent, respectively (Dohlman, et al., 2003).   
  
87 
We compute %MPS and %PSEs for four major oilseeds: groundnut (Table 17 and 
Figure 23), rapeseed (Table 18 and Figure 24), soybean (Table 19 and Figure 24) and 
sunflower (Table 20 and Figure 24). We report estimates under the importable and 
exportable hypotheses and modified procedure for groundnuts, while for the other 
oilseeds we only report estimates as importables. This is because the most likely scenario 
is for oilseeds being imported rather than exported given the margins of comparative 
disadvantage that India has in these products. 
For groundnuts, the relevant adjusted reference price fluctuates across the years 
1985-2002, with Pm, Pe and P* each indicated as relevant in five or more years. The 
general pattern of %MPS again indicates protection when world prices are relatively low 
in the late 1980s and less protection (even disprotection) when world prices are higher in 
the 1990s. Groundnut %PSEs remain mostly positive. For the 1986-1993 period, the 
%MPS indicates that other oilseeds were mostly protected in India. Price protection turns 
to disprotection since the mid 1990s. Again, for rapeseed and sunflower, but not for 
soybeans, the %PSEs generally remain positive.  
Figure 23—Groundnuts %MPS Under the Modified Procedure versus Importable 
























































































Note: MPSm, MPSe and MPScc are computed under the importable and exportable hypotheses and the  
          modified procedure, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table 17—Groundnut Prices, %MPS and PSE Under Various Assumptions, 1985-2002 
 
Note: Relevant Par is in bold (see discussion in text). Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in  
          rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively, which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from  
          those equations (see text for discussion of the adjustments). Domestic prices are for pods. International pod prices are taken as 0.7 times the kernel  
          price (see Table 10).   
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT) 243 224 185 185 220 270 293 267 256 335 351 328 354 311 262 252 242 233
Pcif (US$/MT) 277 258 214 213 268 317 339 313 304 382 401 377 404 361 310 299 290 280
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 12.4 12.4 13.0 13.4 15.7 17.2 20.8 25.9 29.1 31.4 31.6 35.2 35.9 40.1 42.8 44.1 46.8 48.5
Pd (Rs/MT) 4514 4601 5495 6646 5227 7301 9629 10003 8369 8794 10844 11630 12380 12111 13553 12897 11928 13276
Pm (Rs/MT) 3903 3660 3202 3350 4847 6230 8031 9226 10065 13576 14336 15102 16410 16382 15178 15147 15619 15673
Pe (Rs/MT) 2604 2370 2030 2061 2935 3976 5244 5943 6437 9102 9630 9968 11020 10819 9614 9500 9641 9567
P
* (Rs/MT) 2372 5728 5427 11231 3161 6068 8500 13902 6475 9598 8618 15022 8730 12177 -4417 14022 15840 3151
Groundnut %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis 15.6 25.7 71.6 98.4 7.8 17.2 19.9 8.4 -16.9 -35.2 -24.4 -23.0 -24.6 -26.1 -10.7 -14.9 -23.6 -15.3
Exportable Hypothesis 73.3 94.1 170.0 222.3 77.9 83.5 83.7 68.3 29.9 -3.3 12.7 16.8 12.2 11.9 40.8 35.6 23.6 38.7
Modified Procedure 73.3 25.7 71.6 98.4 65.4 20.3 19.9 8.4 29.2 -8.4 12.7 -22.6 12.2 -0.5 40.8 -8.0 -23.6 38.7
Groundnut PSE Under Modified Procedure
MPS (Rs. bil) 12.3 4.8 13.5 19.3 20.0 10.0 12.0 5.5 16.2 -6.3 9.8 -25.7 11.8 -0.5 35.4 -5.9 -23.0 26.3
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.7 5.5 6.7 7.1 7.5 8.4 8.7 9.6 10.2
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) 13.0 5.7 14.1 20.4 21.7 12.1 14.9 8.4 19.5 -2.6 15.3 -19.0 18.8 7.0 43.7 2.8 -13.4 36.5
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator 77.6 30.2 74.8 104.2 71.0 24.6 24.6 12.9 35.1 -3.5 19.7 -16.7 19.8 7.8 50.7 3.7 -13.8 53.8
OECD Denominator 43.7 23.2 42.8 51.0 41.5 19.7 19.8 11.4 26.0 -3.6 16.5 -20.0 16.5 7.2 33.6 3.6 -16.0 35.0 
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Note: Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively,  
          which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from those equations (see text for discussion of the  
          adjustments).  
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT) 360 296 218 220 182 196 189 175 169 198 261 260 260 294 201 172 178 189
Pcif (US$/MT) 408 344 259 261 252 264 254 240 237 265 333 331 331 365 269 240 246 257
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 12.7 12.4 12.9 13.2 15.7 17.2 19.7 25.9 29.6 31.4 31.4 35.2 35.8 40.0 42.7 43.8 46.7 48.8
Pd (Rs/MT) 5098 4044 4383 6922 7310 5691 9363 9342 9075 10282 11920 11446 11507 14230 15359 12650 12458 13155
Pm (Rs/MT) 5819 4889 3938 4105 4685 5363 5918 7283 8215 9675 12057 13334 13641 16674 13435 12464 13575 14741
Rapeseed/Mustard %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis -12.4 -17.3 11.3 68.6 56.0 6.1 58.2 28.3 10.5 6.3 -1.1 -14.2 -15.6 -14.7 14.3 1.5 -8.2 -10.8
Rapeseed/Mustard PSE Under Importable Hypothesis
MPS (Rs. bil) -2.2 1.2 1.2 9.7 11.5 1.4 18.0 12.1 4.1 3.2 -0.8 -11.3 -14.2 -11.5 10.9 1.1 -4.7 -8.5
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 1.0 1.3 1.3 2.2 2.8 3.2 4.0 4.6 5.4 6.3 8.2 9.9 10.8 12.2 14.0 15.6 17.1 18.6
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) -1.2 2.4 2.4 11.9 14.3 4.5 22.1 16.7 9.6 9.5 7.5 -1.4 -3.4 0.8 24.9 16.7 12.3 10.1
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator -6.9 23.8 23.8 84.0 69.6 20.4 71.2 39.0 24.3 18.4 10.7 -1.7 -3.8 1.0 32.7 23.1 21.6 12.8
OECD Denominator -7.4 19.3 19.3 45.7 41.0 17.0 41.6 28.1 19.5 15.6 9.7 -1.8 -3.9 1.0 24.7 18.7 17.8 11.4 
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Table 19—Soybean Prices, %MPS and PSE Under the Importable Hypothesis, 1985-2002 
 
Note: Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively,   
         which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from those equations (see text for discussion of the  
         adjustments). 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT) 223 196 181 216 284 207 212 210 203 242 209 257 271 257 201 188 186 170
Pcif (US$/MT) 271 244 222 257 354 274 278 275 271 310 281 327 342 327 269 256 254 238
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 12.5 12.2 13.0 13.0 15.1 17.0 18.4 25.9 26.9 31.4 31.4 35.2 35.8 38.4 42.4 43.5 46.6 48.3
Pd (Rs/MT) 2667 2786 4208 5508 5285 5087 5858 8130 7300 7913 9258 9600 11692 10775 9017 8683 9658 9777
Pm (Rs/MT) 3833 3418 3346 3873 6033 5336 5876 8075 8319 10943 10071 12957 13785 14224 13058 12814 13602 13246
Soybean %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis -30.4 -18.5 25.8 42.2 -12.4 -4.7 -0.3 0.7 -12.3 -27.7 -8.1 -25.9 -15.2 -24.2 -30.9 -32.2 -29.0 -26.2
Soybean PSE Under Importable Hypothesis
MPS (Rs. bil) -1.2 -0.6 0.8 2.5 -1.4 -0.6 0.0 0.2 -4.8 -11.9 -4.1 -18.1 -13.5 -24.6 -28.6 -21.8 -23.1 -14.8
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.7
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) -1.0 -0.3 1.1 3.1 -0.7 0.1 0.9 1.3 -3.5 -10.3 -2.1 -15.7 -10.9 -21.6 -25.1 -17.9 -18.8 -10.2
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator -24.3 -9.2 36.6 51.4 -6.1 1.0 6.4 4.8 -8.8 -24.0 -4.1 -22.4 -12.2 -21.3 -27.2 -26.5 -23.6 -18.0
OECD Denominator -32.1 -10.1 26.8 33.9 -6.5 1.0 6.0 4.6 -9.7 -31.7 -4.3 -28.9 -13.9 -27.0 -37.3 -36.0 -31.0 -21.9 
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Table 20—Sunflower Prices, %MPS and PSE Under the Importable Hypothesis, 1985-2002 
 
 
Note: Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively,   
         which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from those equations (see text for discussion of the  
         adjustments). 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT) 270 196 183 228 315 231 262 209 241 289 278 277 236 289 238 195 200 276
Pcif (US$/MT) 318 244 223 269 384 299 328 274 309 356 350 348 307 360 306 263 268 344
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 12.4 12.4 13.0 13.4 15.7 17.2 20.8 25.9 29.1 31.4 31.6 35.2 35.9 40.1 42.8 44.1 46.8 48.5
Pd (Rs/MT) 4094 5019 6958 6400 6001 7870 10565 10181 9167 10550 12298 11788 11536 12869 11815 10786 12285 14972
Pm (Rs/MT) 4370 3418 3300 4088 6707 5777 7589 7957 10026 12373 12322 13604 12342 16010 14698 13148 14191 18615
Sunflower %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis -6.3 46.8 110.9 56.5 -10.5 36.2 39.2 27.9 -8.6 -14.7 -0.2 -13.3 -6.5 -19.6 -19.6 -18.0 -13.4 -19.6
Sunflower PSE Under Importable Hypothesis
MPS (Rs. bil) -0.1 0.7 2.3 0.9 -0.4 1.8 3.6 2.6 -1.2 -2.2 0.0 -2.3 -0.7 -3.0 -2.0 -1.7 -1.6 -3.6
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 0 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 50 . 60 . 70 . 91 . 11 . 21 . 31 . 51 . 61 . 81 . 9
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) 0.0 0.8 2.5 1.1 -0.1 2.2 4.0 3.1 -0.6 -1.6 0.9 -1.2 0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 -1.7
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator 2.9 56.2 116.9 71.2 -3.5 43.2 44.3 33.3 -4.3 -10.3 5.7 -6.8 4.3 -10.9 -5.0 -1.1 1.3 -9.2
OECD Denominator 2.8 36.0 53.9 41.6 -3.6 30.2 30.7 25.0 -4.5 -11.5 5.4 -7.3 4.1 -12.2 -5.2 -1.1 1.3 -10.2 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5.6 PULSES 
  India is the world’s largest producer, consumer and importer of pulses. India 
accounts for about one quarter of world production and consumption of pulses and 10 
percent of global imports, amounting to about 6 percent of domestic consumption during 
1995-2001 (Price et al., 2003). Unlike most other agricultural commodities and food 
products, over the past 20 years imports of pulses have been unrestricted and subject to 
low tariffs, currently around 10 percent (USDA-FAS, 2003b). 
5.6.1 Chickpeas 
  Chickpeas are the most common pulse crop grown in India, but there is also 
significant production of several others (particularly, pigeon peas, black matpe and mung 
beans). The state of Madhya Pradesh accounts for over one quarter of pulse production. 
Pulses are grown mostly on non-irrigated marginal land, not in the irrigated areas where 
improved varieties of wheat and rice dominate (Price et al., 2003; USDA-FAS, 2003b).  
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Minimum support prices are generally below market prices for pulses and pulse 
consumption has declined despite rising incomes over the last twenty years. Price et al. 
(2003) attribute this decline to reduced supplies and increased prices of pulses relative to 
other foods, particularly cereals, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. In addition to 
minimum support prices, some states impose taxes on inter-state shipments of certain 
pulse varieties in order to protect their farmers from competition. Tamil Nadu, for 
example, imposes a 4 percent tax on yellow/green peas and chickpeas that are brought 
into the state (Price et al., 2003). 
  Net exports of chickpeas is shown in Figure 25. Imports show substantial 
variability. Price et al. (2003) assert that imports are less correlated with variations in 
domestic production than with the availability of international supplies, and that world 
prices are an important factor affecting import levels. Burma has been the largest exporter 
of chickpeas to the Indian market, supplying over 70 percent of total chickpea imports in 
recent years. 
We compute the national level MPS and PSE for chickpeas under the importables 
hypothesis based on the state-level results for Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and 
Uttar Pradesh. Pd is the April-March marketing year weighted average wholesale price of 
the four states. Adjusted reference prices are based on annual Indian import unit values 
for chickpeas; we assume that the quality differences between imported and domestically 
produced chickpeas are negligible. The resulting %MPS estimates for 1985-2002 vary 
from -61.3 percent and -37.5 percent in 1995 and 1999, respectively, to over 25 percent 
in 1986, 1991, 1998 and 2002 (Figure 26 and Table 21). With few policy-based trade 
barriers, these fluctuations may reflect marketing channel constraints on importing and 
exporting when domestic prices deviate from import price levels. India imported only 
small quantities in the years when the %MPS is estimated to be negative, but did not 
become an exporter.  
Table 21 shows that the PSE has the same pattern as the MPS, because the 
budgetary payments allocated to chickpeas are small (2.50 percent of total fertilizer 
subsidies and 2.29 percent of total irrigation and power subsidies). Only when the MPS  
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estimates assume small negative values in 1988, 1997, 2000 and 2001 are the MPS and 
PSE of opposite signs.  
 
 



















































































Source: FAOSTAT, 2004 
 
 






















































































Source: Authors’ calculations.   
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Table 21—Chickpea Price, %MPS and PSE Under the Importable Hypothesis, 1985-2002 
 
 
Note: Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in rupees (Pr in equations 1 and 2, respectively,  
          which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from those equations (see text for discussion of the  
         adjustments). 





1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT)
Import Unit Value (US$/MT) 414 320 278 342 396 376 329 350 340 468 939 337 330 314 465 323 371 325
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 11.9 12.2 12.8 13.0 14.5 16.7 17.9 24.5 26.4 31.4 31.4 33.5 35.5 37.2 42.1 43.3 45.7 47.7
Pd (Rs/MT) 4284 4776 3326 4101 6446 6130 6818 6590 6658 10597 11137 8122 10540 13796 11769 12325 15473 18564
Pm (Rs/MT) 4612 3574 3299 4126 5307 5839 5436 8145 8539 14009 28795 10772 11104 10823 18870 13304 16078 14470
Chickpea %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis -7.1 33.6 0.8 -0.6 21.5 5.0 25.4 -19.1 -22.0 -24.4 -61.3 -24.6 -5.1 27.5 -37.6 -7.4 -3.8 28.3
Chickpea PSE Under Importable Hypothesis
MPS (Rs. bil) -1.5 7.0 0.1 -0.1 5.8 1.2 7.4 -6.4 -8.3 -17.0 -113.7 -13.2 -3.1 18.2 -48.3 -5.0 -2.1 20.8
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.7 5.4 6.6 7.0 7.5 8.4 8.8 9.7 10.3
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) -0.8 7.8 0.7 1.1 7.5 3.3 10.2 -3.5 -5.1 -13.3 -108.3 -6.6 3.9 25.7 -39.9 3.8 7.5 31.1
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator -3.8 37.6 5.0 7.2 27.7 13.4 35.0 -10.5 -13.4 -19.1 -58.4 -12.3 6.2 38.7 -31.1 5.5 13.3 42.4
OECD Denominator -3.9 27.3 4.7 6.7 21.7 11.8 25.9 -11.7 -15.5 -23.6 -140.3 -14.0 5.9 27.9 -45.2 5.2 11.8 29.8 
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5.7 COTTON 
India is the third largest producer and consumer of cotton after the United States 
and China. India has traditionally been both an exporter and importer of different cotton 
varieties (long and short staple) depending on local harvests and demand from the large 
textile industry (Figure 27). Import and export policy was, however, characterized by 
heavy intervention by the government.  Quantitative restrictions on imports were replaced 
by tariffs in April 2001 and the basic duty on raw cotton has recently been 10 percent.  
Exports were also restricted through quotas until July 2001. Restrictions on cotton yarn 
were not removed until January 2002. Exports to developed countries such as the EU and 
U.S. continued to be restricted through 2004 under the phase-in of the WTO’s Agreement 
on Textiles and Apparel. Since 1999, India has primarily been an important importer of 
cotton. There has been a steady import of extra long staple cotton due to its shortage 
relative to a strong demand and also due to failure of the north Indian crop in 2001-02.  
India’s cotton production policies are less interventionist than for some other 
commodities, particularly the foodgrains, oilseeds and sugar. The Cotton Corporation of 
India (CCI) is responsible for implementing the MSP system among the states. The 
cotton MSPs are typically below the market prices and the CCI functions are generally 
limited to commercial operations.
39 The GOI also has a statutory hand hank yarn policy 
that requires 50 percent of a mill’s output of yarn destined for the domestic market to be 
produced in the form of hank yarn for use by the handloom industry. The government 
subsidizes the sale of handloom products and provides interest rate subsidies on loans to 
the textile industry for technology upgrades (USDA-FAS, 2004a). 
 
                                                 
39 Until recently the state of Maharashtra had a monopoly cotton procurement scheme that it has dismantled 
to allow private traders to purchase cotton directly from farmers (USDA-FAS, 2004a).   
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Following Gulati and Pursell (forthcoming), the MPS for cotton is calculated 
under the importable and exportable hypotheses on the basis of seed cotton or kapas. The 
farmer sells cotton to the mills where it gets converted to cotton lint and cottonseed.
40 
Although India produces short, medium, medium long, and long staple cotton, we have 
based our calculations on the simplifying assumption that production is of the medium 
staple variety. In 2000-01, medium and medium long staple cotton made up 54 percent of 
production, followed by long (36 percent), short (7 percent) and extra long staple (3 
percent).  
Since cotton kapas is not traded internationally, as in Gulati and Pursell 
(forthcoming), we compute the U.S. f.o.b. price of cotton kapas as: 
 
                                                 
40 Because of the complex interactions between cotton and textiles and apparel production, consumption 
and trade, we did not attempt to estimate an autarky cotton price using the procedure applied to other crops 
above.  
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(9)   Kapas f.o.b. U.S. = (1 1/8” cotton lint CIF Europe – TEU:US + 1.903 * U.S.     
cottonseed price)/ 2.94 
 
where TEU:US is the international freight between the EU and U.S. and the conversion 
between kapas and its products, cotton lint and cottonseed, is given by: 
 
(10)   294 kg cotton kapas = 100 kg lint + 190.3 kg cottonseed.  
 
Under the importable hypothesis, the kapas f.o.b. U.S. price plus the international 
freight from the U.S. to India provides the unadjusted reference price at the border. The 
reference price at the border is adjusted by subtracting the trading margin and domestic 
transport costs from the production region in Gujarat to Bombay, where it is assumed that 
the competition between the domestically produced cotton and the imported cotton 
occurs. Under the exportable hypothesis, the kapas f.o.b. U.S. price gives the reference 
price at the border (in Bombay).
41 The internal adjustments are computed as under the 
importable hypothesis.  
Table 22 and Figure 28 shows that the resulting %MPS varies over time under 
both hypotheses. Levels of support or disprotection are modest except in 1988 following 
a sharp increase in domestic prices. After the late 1980s, there is a trend towards 
decreased levels of protection and even increasing levels of disprotection under the 
importable hypothesis in 1998-2002. Under the exportable hypothesis, cotton receives 
positive support but again the level declines in recent years, a shift in contrast with wheat, 
rice and sugar. With large imports coming into India in 1999-2002, one would expect the 
adjusted reference price to be less than or equal to the domestic price in order for imports 
to be competitive. A quality difference may explain this result, in part because imports of 
the extra long staple variety command a premium price. 
                                                 
41 In the case of cotton, insurance cost assumed to equal one percent of the f.o.b U.S. price of cotton lint are 
subtracted.   
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Table 22—Cotton Prices, %MPS and PSE Under the Importable and Exportable Hypotheses, 1985-2002 
Note: Prices are for kapas (see text). Multiplication of Pexporterfob and Pcif by the exchange rate gives the unadjusted reference prices in rupees (Pr in   
equations 1 and 2, respectively, which are not shown in the table). Pm and Pe (shown above) are the adjusted reference prices from those equations 
(see text for discussion of the adjustments). Source: Authors’ calculations.  
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price Data
Pexporterfob (US$/MT) 597 466 597 553 559 640 743 474 521 576 769 774 678 603 591 486 564 564
Pcif (US$/MT) 629 498 624 579 586 659 759 504 544 603 800 799 699 627 609 513 589 589
Exchange Rate (Rs/US$) 12.7 12.3 13.0 13.1 15.3 17.1 18.9 25.9 28.2 31.4 31.4 35.2 35.9 39.3 42.5 43.6 46.6 48.5
Pd (Rs/MT) 5662 4920 5938 11833 8538 8487 10963 13625 10164 16860 23750 17550 18132 22862 19494 18555 19462 16162
Pm (Rs/MT) 6373 4438 6346 5651 6956 9070 11935 10313 12318 15617 21611 24309 21218 20808 22022 18471 23551 24641
Pe (Rs/MT) 5139 3469 5381 4639 5489 7528 10191 8382 9887 12756 18568 20750 17413 16856 17479 14349 19003 19909
Cotton %MPS Estimates
Importable Hypothesis -11.2 10.9 -6.4 109.4 22.7 -6.4 -8.1 32.1 -17.5 8.0 9.9 -27.8 -14.5 9.9 -11.5 0.5 -17.4 -34.4
Exportable Hypothesis 10.2 41.8 10.3 155.1 55.5 12.7 7.6 62.6 2.8 32.2 27.9 -15.4 4.1 35.6 11.5 29.3 2.4 -18.8
Cotton PSE Under Importable Hypothesis
MPS (Rs. bil) -3.1 2.1 -1.4 20.1 7.0 -3.4 -4.9 16.4 -12.5 6.8 13.0 -44.3 -22.4 11.4 -15.8 0.5 -19.9 -43.6
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 1.6 1.9 1.1 2.2 3.6 4.5 6.2 6.1 6.7 7.5 11.8 14.4 15.1 15.5 17.2 17.3 19.3 20.3
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) -1.5 4.0 -0.4 22.3 10.6 1.1 1.3 22.5 -5.8 14.3 24.8 -29.9 -7.3 26.9 1.3 17.8 -0.6 -23.3
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator -5.5 20.3 -1.6 121.5 34.2 2.0 2.2 44.0 -8.1 16.7 18.9 -18.8 -4.7 23.4 1.0 16.4 -0.5 -18.4
OECD Denominator -5.8 16.8 -1.6 54.9 25.5 2.0 2.2 30.6 -8.9 14.3 15.9 -23.1 -5.0 18.9 1.0 14.1 -0.5 -22.6
PSE Under Exportable Hypothesis
MPS (Rs. bil) 2.3 6.5 2.0 23.4 13.6 5.6 3.9 26.0 1.6 22.5 31.4 -21.0 5.2 33.2 12.6 24.7 2.2 -19.3
Budgetary Payments (Rs. bil) 1.6 1.9 1.1 2.2 3.6 4.5 6.2 6.1 6.7 7.5 11.8 14.4 15.1 15.5 17.2 17.3 19.3 20.3
Nominal PSE (Rs. bil) 3.8 8.3 3.1 25.6 17.1 10.0 10.1 32.1 8.3 30.0 43.3 -6.6 20.3 48.8 29.8 42.1 21.5 1.0
PSE (%)
Trade Economist Denominator 17.2 53.8 16.1 169.8 70.1 22.9 19.7 77.2 14.4 42.9 38.4 -4.8 16.1 52.3 27.2 49.9 23.3 1.0
OECD Denominator 14.7 35.0 13.9 62.9 41.2 18.6 16.5 43.6 12.6 30.0 27.8 -5.1 13.8 34.3 21.4 33.3 18.9 1.0 
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Adding fertilizer, power and irrigation subsidies to the MPS for cotton gives the 
cotton PSE. We assume that cotton production accounts for 7.14 percent of total fertilizer 
use and 4.10 percent of total irrigation and power usage. The %PSEs in Table 22 show 
the same pattern as the %MPS. Aside from the unusual year 1988, the %PSE results 
under the importable hypothesis ranging from -18.8 percent in 1996 to 44.0 percent in 
1992 with the trade economist denominator, and from -23.1 percent in 1996 to 30.6 
percent in 1992 with the OECD denominator. Under the exportable hypothesis the %PSE 
is positive in all years except for 1996 when world prices peaked.    
 



























































































6 LIVESTOCK  SECTORS 
 
  Our analysis of market price support and PSEs does not include livestock 
products. However, in this section we briefly review recent assessments made by other 
analysts of the dairy and poultry sectors. 
6.1 DAIRY 
  India is the second largest milk producer after the EU, and among the top ten milk 
consuming countries. India has the largest number of cows producing milk (36.5 million) 
but the lowest yield of cow milk (Table 23). Unlike the other major dairy producing 
countries, buffalo milk makes up the majority (56 percent) of total milk production in 
India (USDA-FAS, 2003a). Buffaloes are relatively more productive than indigenous 
cows, but less productive than crossbred cows (Sharma, Rakotoarisoa and Gulati, 
2004).
42 The fat-based pricing system favors buffalo milk compared to cow milk (USDA-
FAS, 2003a).      
Smallholder farms each with one to two cows dominate the milk production 
system and have benefited from the Operation Flood program launched in 1970-71. The 
goal of Operation Flood was to provide an additional source of income to small and 
marginal farmers and landless labourers in rural areas. Through a network of 
cooperatives, the program established a marketing link between rural producers and 
urban consumers (Sharma, Rakotoarisoa and Gulati, 2004). This took place in an autarkic 
environment where domestic production was protected from imports of dairy products by 
quantitative restrictions, other non-tariff barriers, and the routing of imports through the 
Indian Dairy Corporation. Exports of dairy products were also restricted. 
  Coinciding with the move towards liberalization in the early 1990s, the dairy 
industry was deregulated to encourage private investment and technology advancement in 
                                                 
42 For example, in March 2002 for buffalo milk the average price ranged from Rs. 12.30 to Rs. 14.50 per 
liter (US$ 267 to US$ 315 per MT) for 7 percent fat, 9 percent solid not fat (SNF) compared to cow milk 
that was priced at Rs. 8.50 to Rs. 12.50 per liter (US$ 185 to US$ 272 per MT) for 4 percent fat, 8.5 percent 
SNF (USDA-FAS, 2003a).  
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the sector. By March 2003, the GOI had abolished restrictions on production and retained 
only regulations relating to food safety and hygiene (GOI, Undated-a). 
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  Table 23—Major Milk Producing Countries, 2003 
Country  Cows In Milk         
(1,000 HEAD) 
Cows Milk Production 
(1,000 MT) 
Average Yield Per 
Cow (MT/HEAD) 




European Union-15  19,750 115,450 5.85 2,450 117,900
India 36,500 36,500 1.00 47,500 84,000
United States  9,090 77,075 8.48 0 77,075
Russian Federation  11,700 32,500 2.78 0 32,500
Brazil 15,300 22,860 1.49 0 22,860
China 3,417 15,550 4.55 1,120 16,670
New Zealand  3,842 14,346 3.73 0 14,346
Ukraine 4,715 13,306 2.82 277 13,583
Poland 2,967 11,966 4.03 30 11,996
Australia 2,298 10,636 4.63 0 10,636
 




Trade in fluid milk is negligible due to lack of transportation infrastructure and 
effective demand. However, ultra heat treated (UHT) milk is gaining acceptance in the 
domestic market and some cooperatives have begun to export UHT milk to the Middle 
East (USDA-FAS, 2003a). Imports of non-fat dry milk (see figure 29), butter oil, 
yoghurt, curdled milk, whey, grated cheese, and blue veined cheese are permitted under 
open general license at a tariff rate of 30.4 percent (USDA-FAS, 2003a). Effective June 
2000, a TRQ for skimmed milk powder was established with a quota of 10,000 tons at a 
15 percent duty, and an over-quota tariff of 60 percent. Exports of non-fat dry milk 
totalled 23,000 tons in 2003 (Figure 24). Exports of other dairy products are negligible 
(USDA-FAS, 2003a). 
  While we have not included the dairy sector in the PSEs computed in this study, 
Sharma, Rakotoarisoa and Gulati (2004) compute NPCs under the importable hypothesis 
at shadow exchange rates for milk powder, butter, ghee (butter oil) and recombined milk 
for four metropolitan areas (Mumbai, Calcutta, Chennai and Delhi) representing four 
regions of India for the period 1975-2000. Table 24 presents their all India results 
(aggregated based on production weights) for 1985-2000 with conversion to a %MPS 
measure using two alternative reference prices for each product.
43 The first “f.o.b. North 
Europe” is the given export price of each dairy product. The second “Netherlands 
Domestic Price” accounts for the export subsidy component of the EU export price. The 
Netherlands domestic price is approximately equal to the f.o.b. North Europe price plus 
the export subsidy given by the EU on dairy products (Sharma, Rakotoarisoa and Gulati, 
2004). 
  The %MPS results using an adjusted reference price based on the Netherlands 
domestic price are considerable lower, and in most cases of opposite sign than the results 
using an adjusted reference price based on f.o.b. North Europe prices. Sharma, 
Rakotoarisoa and Gulati attribute the gradual reduction in the %MPS over time to an 
improvement in world prices from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s and to depreciation of 
the rupee. The %MPS of butter and ghee based on f.o.b. North Europe reference prices 
                                                 
43 (NPC-1)*100 = %MPS  
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increase in the late 1990s to 2000 because of falling world prices for these products 
during this time period.  
Interestingly, India’s milk powder %MPS is negative in several years in the mid 
1990s to 2000, even based on the f.o.b. North Europe reference price. This indicates that 
India’s domestic milk powder is competitive with imported milk powder and may be 
export competitive. India was a net exporter of skim milk powder in all years between 
1994 and 2000, except 1998 and 1999 (when the %MPS for milk powder based on the 
f.o.b. North Europe price is positive).  
 





























































































Change in Stocks Net Exports Total
 
 
Source: USDA-FAS PSD database, January 2004.  
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Table 24—India Dairy Percent MPS under Alternative World Prices, 1985-2000 
 
 
Note: All are at shadow exchange rates. 
Source: Sharma, Rakotoarisoa and Gulati (2004). 
 
 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Dairy %MPS Estimates
Skim Milk Powder Based On:
FOB North Europe 128.9 114.8 78.6 21.0 24.2 18.6 20.2 9.6 21.3 -6.7 -20.3 -8.1 -7.1 3.2 10.8 -24.4
Netherlands Domestic Price 7.9 -21.6 -24.7 -21.7 -8.6 -31.8 -28.4 -30.5 -21.8 -34.8 -41.5 -34.2 -33.1 -38.1 -32.1 -50.0
Butter Based On:
FOB North Europe 130.2 179.3 238.9 104.9 74.9 148.2 102.6 75.7 110.0 84.6 57.0 135.7 108.4 89.4 159.9 151.8
Netherlands Domestic Price -17.2 -27.1 1.8 -8.2 -22.4 -22.5 -26.0 -41.4 -25.2 -21.0 -12.8 -11.6 -5.4 -15.5 -28.9 -31.0
Ghee Based On:
FOB North Europe 133.1 196.3 244.1 111.1 72.6 121.8 105.4 69.4 95.4 101.5 50.8 75.4 60.5 49.0 104.1 89.9
Netherlands Domestic Price -19.4 -25.9 -4.9 -16.4 -29.0 -29.7 -27.0 -44.0 -33.2 -19.9 -26.4 -32.6 -26.3 -32.5 -41.8 -45.8
Milk Based On:
FOB North Europe 201.9 207.0 192.7 76.4 54.8 86.7 68.0 39.9 75.1 44.9 21.2 44.4 50.3 50.4 76.2 36.3
Netherlands Domestic Price 16.6 -10.2 0.4 -7.0 -13.1 -18.9 -21.2 -32.9 -15.5 -20.8 -25.8 -22.0 -13.5 -22.5 -27.0 -36.2 
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6.2 POULTRY 
India ranks as the sixth largest poultry producer in the world after the United 
States, Brazil, the European Union, China and Mexico. India’s poultry meat production is 
estimated to have grown at a rate of six percent annually during the 1980s, 11 percent 
annually during the 1990s, and 19 percent annually during 1997-2002 (Landes et al., 
2004). Fuelled by increased vertical integration, particularly in southern India, production 
reached 1.6 million tons in 2003 and is projected to total 1.8 million tons in 2004 (FAS-
PSD). Poultry meat accounts for 6 percent of total meat consumption in India, while fish 
makes up more than half and bovine meat (cow and buffalo) accounts for 29 percent of 
meat consumption, according to FAO data (Landes et al., 2004).
44 Consumers prefer 
fresh poultry and typically broilers for home consumption are purchased live and 
slaughtered in small, local shops (USDA-FAS, 2003e). Consumer preferences and lack of 
cold storage facilities constrain demand for chilled and processed poultry products. 
Processed poultry products constitute only about 7 percent of total poultry meat 
production (USDA-FAS, 2003e). 
The poultry sector receives less government assistance than other sectors. The 
Agricultural and Processed Products Export Development Authority, a government 
export promotion agency, provides cold storage and airfreight subsidies for export of 
eggs and egg products, primarily to the Middle East (USDA-FAS, 2003e). Government 
assistance to the poultry sector totalled Rs. 72 million (US$1.6 million) in 2002/03 and is 
budgeted at Rs. 85 million (US$1.8 million) in 2003/04 (FAS, 2003). India has no 
restrictions on foreign direct investment in the poultry industry (Landes et al., 2004). 
  India eliminated its quantitative restrictions on poultry meat imports in April 
2001. Imports of poultry meat products, as well as breeding stock, are now subject to 
tariffs ranging from 40 percent for grandparent stock to 108 percent for poultry meat to 
                                                 
44 The figure for bovine meat is controversial and surprisingly high in the predominantly Hindu country 
(Landes et al., 2004).  
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141 percent for processed poultry products. Phytosanitary regulations and clearance 
procedures add to the protection provided to the poultry industry by high tariff.  
India also exports some poultry meat (Figure 30). A comparison of production 
costs in India and other major producing countries reveals that while Brazil is the lowest 
cost producer, India’s cost of production appears to be competitive with the United States 
and Thailand, both major exporters (Table 25). Farm gate prices in the southern, western 
and eastern regions of India (US$0.48 to US$0.66 per kg live weight in 2001) are 
between those of two major low cost producers: Brazil (US$0.48 per kg live weight) and 
Thailand (US$0.68 per kg live weight). This would seem to indicate that India is 
internationally competitive in poultry meat production. However, other studies have 
indicated that India is only price competitive in eggs, and is not competitive in whole 
chicken or chicken products (Mehta, 2003).       
 



























































































Table 25—Broiler Variable Cost of Production and Farm Gate Prices by Country, 
2001 
Country  Variable Cost 
(US$/kg live weight) 
Farm Gate Price 
(US$/kg live weight) 
    
Brazil 0.38  0.48 
Indonesia --  0.74 
Philippines 0.94  0.78 
Taiwan --  1.03 
Thailand 0.61  0.68 
United States  0.56  0.87 
India:    
North 0.62  0.84 
West 0.59  0.48 
East   0.55  0.52 
South 0.60  0.66 
 
Note: -- is not available  




7. TOTAL  PSE 
 
The analysis above has presented commodity-specific MPS and PSE results for 
eleven crops and brief discussion of the dairy and poultry sectors. For the crops, budget 
support in the form of subsidies for fertilizer, electricity and irrigation have been 
allocated on the basis of estimated usage (for fertilizer) and irrigated acreage (for 
electricity and irrigation subsidies). In calculating market price support, we have paid 
attention to international and domestic transportation, marketing and processing costs that 
cause a wedge between adjusted reference prices for imports versus exports. We have 
evaluated these costs on a regional basis for all crops except soybeans, sunflower and 
cotton. We have also estimated autarky prices that might prevail in the absence of policy 
interventions for six commodities (rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, sugar and groundnuts) for 
which the patterns of trade show fluctuations between net imports and exports in various 
years. For these commodities, we have evaluated support as %MPS and %PSE under a 
procedure of selecting the appropriate reference price based on the relationship among 
the estimated autarky, import and export adjusted reference prices, and compared the 
%MPS results to those derived when the importable and exportable hypotheses is applied 
in all years. 
A summary of the results of the commodity-specific analysis using the modified 
procedure to select adjusted reference prices for the six crops, while assuming that 
rapeseed, soybeans, sunflowers, chickpeas and cotton are imported, is shown in Table 
26.
45 Wheat, rice and sugar dominate these results numerically. For example, in 2002 
these three commodities are estimated to receive two-thirds of the budget support (Rs. 
billion 300.1 out of a total for all of agriculture of of Rs. billion 444.9). Likewise, the 
nominal PSE of these three commodities was Rs. billion 470.3, compared to a nominal 
value for the eleven commodities of Rs. billion 619.8, a share of 75.9 percent. But these 
three commodities also account for nearly 75 percent of the value of production of the 
                                                 
45 Results under the importable and exportable hypotheses are also shown in earlier tables and summary 
tables are available upon request.   
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Table 26—Summary of the Commodity-Specific PSEs under the Modified Procedure, 1985-2002 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cereals
Wheat
PSE (Rs. bil) 9.4 15.1 5.2 10.3 25.1 0.2 23.2 0.2 -9.6 45.4 61.4 -32.0 -47.6 101.0 134.5 235.0 171.2 126.6 125.1
MPS (Rs. bil) 0.7 4.8 -3.2 -5.1 3.2 -26.0 -11.7 -36.7 -51.6 -2.4 -7.5 -115.4 -136.4 4.9 26.4 120.0 44.6 -9.2 -23.9
BP (Rs. bil) 8.7 10.3 8.4 15.5 21.9 26.2 34.9 36.9 42.0 47.8 68.9 83.5 88.8 96.1 108.2 114.9 126.6 135.8 148.9
PSE (%) 12.4 17.9 6.5 11.2 21.7 0.2 15.1 0.1 -4.8 18.5 20.5 -10.4 -13.5 24.6 28.5 43.9 32.6 21.7 21.6
Rice
PSE (Rs. bil) -6.3 28.5 19.7 -20.6 -31.0 -28.7 -8.1 -109.9 -15.9 -162.7 -31.3 -292.0 -147.0 50.6 -32.8 200.1 85.5 256.9
MPS (Rs. bil) -15.8 17.2 11.3 -36.4 -54.2 -56.8 -46.2 -149.1 -60.1 -212.6 -105.5 -382.0 -242.2 -50.7 -146.3 81.4 -41.1 130.3
BP (Rs. bil) 9.5 11.3 8.3 15.7 23.1 28.1 38.0 39.2 44.1 49.9 74.2 90.0 95.2 101.4 113.5 118.7 131.1 139.9
PSE (%) -4.5 17.9 12.9 -14.4 -15.0 -11.5 -2.8 -33.6 -4.3 -35.0 -5.8 -52.5 -22.7 6.8 -3.9 22.1 10.0 28.6
Coarse Grains
Corn
PSE (Rs. bil) 0.5 1.9 4.7 5.1 1.5 2.3 0.7 2.1 2.6 -4.0 4.0 -2.3 9.4 2.1 9.3 8.6 8.8 9.5
MPS (Rs. bil) 0.0 1.3 4.2 4.1 0.2 0.8 -1.3 -0.1 0.1 -6.8 0.1 -7.1 4.3 -3.5 2.9 1.7 1.2 1.3
BP (Rs. bil) 0.5 1.9 4.7 5.1 1.5 2.3 0.7 2.1 2.6 -4.0 4.0 -2.3 9.4 2.1 9.3 8.6 8.8 9.5
PSE (%) 4.2 16.2 33.6 41.0 8.3 11.6 3.1 6.6 8.8 -13.4 9.8 -5.4 17.8 4.4 15.5 12.6 13.0 12.9
Sorghum
PSE (Rs. bil) 4.3 5.5 7.6 11.7 6.5 9.1 15.2 -4.5 8.6 -0.2 0.1 -8.4 26.9 -1.4 18.2 26.0 0.6 20.0
MPS (Rs. bil) 3.8 4.9 7.3 11.0 5.3 7.7 13.2 -6.4 6.5 -2.5 -3.7 -13.1 22.1 -6.3 12.7 20.5 -5.4 13.7
B P  ( R s .  b i l ) 0 . 50 . 60 . 30 . 71 . 11 . 42 . 02 . 02 . 12 . 43 . 84 . 74 . 95 . 05 . 55 . 46 . 06 . 3
PSE (%) 21.3 27.3 40.0 43.8 22.0 23.9 47.8 -17.0 21.0 -0.5 0.3 -16.7 45.8 -3.1 26.8 35.1 1.2 39.7
Sugar
PSE (Rs. bil) 14.7 16.8 18.6 16.5 3.3 -6.2 3.1 -4.9 2.5 5.5 -35.4 1.5 25.6 33.9 74.4 78.2 43.0 86.8
MPS (Rs. bil) 12.9 14.7 17.2 13.7 -0.8 -11.3 -3.9 -11.9 -5.3 -3.3 -48.9 -14.8 8.4 15.8 54.3 57.4 20.1 62.4
BP (Rs. bil) 1.8 2.1 1.4 2.7 4.1 5.1 7.0 7.0 7.8 8.8 13.5 16.4 17.2 18.1 20.1 20.7 22.9 24.4
PSE (%) 55.7 50.3 46.3 33.9 6.2 -1.7 4.4 9.7 2.7 5.1 -9.2 14.9 15.8 19.7 36.1 31.6 16.2 32.8
Oilseeds
Groundnuts
PSE (Rs. bil) 13.0 5.7 14.1 20.4 21.7 12.1 14.9 8.4 19.5 -2.6 15.3 -19.0 18.8 7.0 43.7 2.8 -13.4 36.5
MPS (Rs. bil) 12.3 4.8 13.5 19.3 20.0 10.0 12.0 5.5 16.2 -6.3 9.8 -25.7 11.8 -0.5 35.4 -5.9 -23.0 26.3
BP (Rs. bil) 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.7 5.5 6.7 7.1 7.5 8.4 8.7 9.6 10.2
PSE (%) 43.7 23.2 42.8 51.0 41.5 19.7 19.8 11.4 26.0 -3.6 16.5 -20.0 16.5 7.2 33.6 3.6 -16.0 35.0
Rapeseed
PSE (Rs. bil) -1.2 2.4 2.4 11.9 14.3 4.5 22.1 16.7 9.6 9.5 7.5 -1.4 -3.4 0.8 24.9 16.7 12.3 10.1
MPS (Rs. bil) -2.2 1.2 1.2 9.7 11.5 1.4 18.0 12.1 4.1 3.2 -0.8 -11.3 -14.2 -11.5 10.9 1.1 -4.7 -8.5
BP (Rs. bil) 1.0 1.3 1.3 2.2 2.8 3.2 4.0 4.6 5.4 6.3 8.2 9.9 10.8 12.2 14.0 15.6 17.1 18.6
PSE (%) -7.4 19.3 19.3 45.7 41.0 17.0 41.6 28.1 19.5 15.6 9.7 -1.8 -3.9 1.0 24.7 18.7 17.8 11.4
Soybean
PSE (Rs. bil) -1.0 -0.3 1.1 3.1 -0.7 0.1 0.9 1.3 -3.5 -10.3 -2.1 -15.7 -10.9 -21.6 -25.1 -17.9 -18.8 -10.2
MPS (Rs. bil) -1.2 -0.6 0.8 2.5 -1.4 -0.6 0.0 0.2 -4.8 -11.9 -4.1 -18.1 -13.5 -24.6 -28.6 -21.8 -23.1 -14.8
B P  ( R s .  b i l ) 0 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 50 . 70 . 81 . 01 . 11 . 41 . 62 . 02 . 42 . 73 . 03 . 53 . 94 . 34 . 7
PSE (%) -32.1 -10.1 26.8 33.9 -6.5 1.0 6.0 4.6 -9.7 -31.7 -4.3 -28.9 -13.9 -27.0 -37.3 -36.0 -31.0 -21.9
Sunflower
PSE (Rs. bil) 0.0 0.8 2.5 1.1 -0.1 2.2 4.0 3.1 -0.6 -1.6 0.9 -1.2 0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 -1.7
MPS (Rs. bil) -0.1 0.7 2.3 0.9 -0.4 1.8 3.6 2.6 -1.2 -2.2 0.0 -2.3 -0.7 -3.0 -2.0 -1.7 -1.6 -3.6
B P  ( R s .  b i l ) 0 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 50 . 60 . 70 . 91 . 11 . 21 . 31 . 51 . 61 . 81 . 9





Note: OECD Denominator. Chickpeas, rapeseed, soybeans, sunflower and cotton are evaluated under the importable hypothesis. 





1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Pulses
Chickpea
PSE (Rs. bil) -0.8 7.8 0.7 1.1 7.5 3.3 10.2 -3.5 -5.1 -13.3 -108.3 -6.6 3.9 25.7 -39.9 3.8 7.5 31.1
MPS (Rs. bil) -1.5 7.0 0.1 -0.1 5.8 1.2 7.4 -6.4 -8.3 -17.0 -113.7 -13.2 -3.1 18.2 -48.3 -5.0 -2.1 20.8
BP (Rs. bil) 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.7 5.4 6.6 7.0 7.5 8.4 8.8 9.7 10.3
PSE (%) -3.9 27.3 4.7 6.7 21.7 11.8 25.9 -11.7 -15.5 -23.6 -140.3 -14.0 5.9 27.9 -45.2 5.2 11.8 29.8
Cotton
PSE (Rs. bil) -1.5 4.0 -0.4 22.3 10.6 1.1 1.3 22.5 -5.8 14.3 24.8 -29.9 -7.3 26.9 1.3 17.8 -0.6 -23.3
MPS (Rs. bil) -3.1 2.1 -1.4 20.1 7.0 -3.4 -4.9 16.4 -12.5 6.8 13.0 -44.3 -22.4 11.4 -15.8 0.5 -19.9 -43.6
BP (Rs. bil) 1.6 1.9 1.1 2.2 3.6 4.5 6.2 6.1 6.7 7.5 11.8 14.4 15.1 15.5 17.2 17.3 19.3 20.3
PSE (%) -5.8 16.8 -1.6 54.9 25.5 2.0 2.2 30.6 -8.9 14.3 15.9 -23.1 -5.0 18.9 1.0 14.1 -0.5 -22.6
Total - Modified Procedure
PSEc (Rs. bil) 35.2 89.4 80.3 90.1 68.9 17.2 104.3 -37.0 22.1 -97.4 -9.7 -341.6 -89.5 268.6 259.0 625.2 360.7 619.8
PSE (Rs. bil) 42.8 155.3 148.7 132.5 64.9 -60.2 91.5 -257.9 -151.5 -483.2 -281.4 -1144.1 -586.5 209.9 128.2 961.8 273.4 905.3 
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eleven commodities (Table 9). Thus, on average, in 2002 the other eight covered 
commodities received a share of the nominal PSE about proportional to their value in 
production. 
The calculation of a “Total PSE” for agriculture is derived from the commodity-
specific estimates of MPS and total budget support. Results for the total PSE are shown 
in Table 27 and Figure 31, again using the modified procedure to select adjusted 
reference prices for rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, sugar and groundnuts and assuming that 
rapeseed, soybeans, sunflowers, chickpeas and cotton are imported. As discussed above, 
we compute total MPSc and PSEc without scaling up the estimated market price support, 
as well as total MPS and PSE using the scaling up procedure.  
In broad terms, a counter-cyclical pattern to protection and support, versus 
disprotection, of agriculture is evident at the aggregate level. Support is provided in the 
mid 1980s when world prices were low, turns to disprotection through the 1990s, and 
emerges as protection and support again after 1998 when world prices are again relatively 
low. 
The relative importance of budget payments for input subsidies versus output 
market price interventions in providing recent support is evident from a comparison of 
MPSc for the eleven covered commodities to the BP for agriculture. In the period 1985-
1988, positive market price support exceeded budgetary payments, so price support 
accounted for 52 percent of the total support provided, as measured by the PSEc. In the 
period 1989-1997, market price support was negative in each year and remained large 
enough in magnitude to result in negative support measured by PSEc in five years. This is 
in contrast to 1998-2002, when BP has exceeded MPSc so even when aggregate price 
support is negative, the sum of price and budget support (PSEc) is positive.  
In the recent two years in which market price support has been positive (2000 
and 2002), it accounts for only 39.7 percent of support measured by the PSEc (MPSc of 
423.3 Rs. billion versus budget payments of 821.9 Rs. billion for the two years). In those 
years in which MPSc has been negative (1998, 1999 and 2001), the budget support  
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provided has been five times as large (a total of 1,091.6 Rs. Billion versus MPSc of -
203.3 Rs. billion). 
When the MPSc component of the PSE is relatively small, it makes relatively 
little difference whether the scaling up procedure is applied or not (as in 1985, 1989, 
1991, 1998, 1999 or 2001, see Table 27 and Figure 31). In contrast, when world prices 
were high in 1996 and the negative nominal MPSc was more than double the positive 
budget support (Rs. billion -621.0 compared to Rs. billion 279.4), the scaled up PSE (Rs. 
billion -1,144) is more than three times larger in magnitude than the PSEc without scaling 
up (Rs. billion -341.6).  
In percentage terms, both the %PSEc without scaling up (-10.3 percent using the 
OECD denominator) and the total %PSE with scaling up (-34.5 percent) and are their 
most negative in 1996.
46 The PSEc reaches 12.7 percent and the %PSE reaches 19.5 
percent in 2000, their highest positive values. The PSEc results over the 1985-2002 period 
show positive support for agriculture of nearly 10 percent in the mid 1980s that declines 
to a nearly neutral policy effect in the mid 1990s. Support drops to its lowest value 
(disprotection) when world prices were high in 1996 then rises during 1997-2002 to a 
level again around 10 percent. The scaled up PSE follows a similar pattern over time, but 
shows higher support (near 20 percent) in the 1980s falling to greater percentages of 
disprotection from 1992-1997. 
For purposes of comparison, the total PSEs calculated under the exportable and 
importable hypotheses for all commodities in all years are shown in Tables 28 and 29 and 
Figures 32 and 33. Results under the exportable hypothesis are relatively close to those 
under the modified procedure, especially during the mid 1990s. Support for agriculture is 
                                                 
46 Our discussion focuses on %PSEc and %PSE measured using the OECD denominator but Table 27 (and 
Tables 28 and 29 below) also report the %PSE using the “trade economist” denominator. For total value of 
production at international adjusted reference prices we have approximated simply by subtracting the 
nominal MPS for our 11 covered commodities from the value of total agricultural production at domestic 
prices. The results with the OECD denominator are again larger (smaller) in absolute value than those for 
the trade economist denominator when the %PSEc or %PSE is negative (positive), but the differences are 
small in most years. For either denominator, the difference between the %PSEc and %PSE can be large and 
they can be of different signs. 
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estimated to be somewhat higher in the 1980s and during 1998-2002 under the exportable 
hypothesis, particularly when measured with scaling up to the PSE.  
The results under the importable hypothesis also show a similar pattern over time 
to the results under the modified procedure but the magnitude of the estimates differs to a 
greater extent. Disprotection of agriculture measured either by PSEc or PSE is more 
pronounced in the 1989-1997 period under the importable hypothesis than under the 
modified procedure. Scaling up has a more pronounced effect because MPSc is larger in 
magnitude under the importable hypothesis. In subsequent years, agriculture is slightly 
supported without scaling up but remains slightly disprotected even during 1998-2002 
under the importable hypothesis and the scaled up PSE.  
Under both the importable and exportable hypotheses, the level of estimated 
disprotection in the 1990s as measured by the scaled up PSE is less in magnitude than 
estimated earlier by Gulati and Narayanan (2003). For example, in our analysis 
disprotection measured by the PSE falls to its lowest values, –59.4 percent under the 
importable hypothesis and –28.7 percent under the exportable hypothesis, in 1996, 
compared to declines to –101.9 percent and –68.5 percent, respectively, in 1997 in the 
analysis by Gulati and Narayanan (see Figure 9).  
As noted above, Gulati and Narayanan make their calculations with MSP or 
procurement prices even when these prices are below those prevailing in domestic 
markets. Moreover, the denominator for their PSE measure does not include budget 
payments (see the equation in Section 4). Both these factors contribute to the more 
negative estimates of the PSE. Additionally, without scaling up we report a greater 
difference with the earlier results under both the importable and exportable hypotheses. 
Thus, all three dimensions of our analysis—how price comparisons are made under the 
importable or exportable hypothesis, whether market price support measured for the 
covered commodities is scaled up to apply (implicitly) to other commodities, and whether 
autarky prices are considered as possibly relevant reference prices each affect the 
reported MPS and PSE results and their interpretation.  
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Table 27—Total PSE Under the Modified Procedure, 1985-2002  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Measured Support (Rs. bil)
MPSc 5.9 54.7 53.2 39.8 -3.7 -70.4 -13.3 -159.6 -116.9 -254.9 -240.1 -621.0 -386.1 -49.8 -98.5 248.3 -55.0 175.0
BP 29.3 34.7 27.1 50.3 72.6 87.6 117.5 122.6 138.9 157.5 230.4 279.4 296.6 318.4 357.5 377.0 415.7 444.9
Covered Share 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.38
MPS (Rs. bil) 13.4 120.6 121.6 82.1 -7.6 -147.8 -26.0 -380.5 -290.4 -640.7 -511.8 -1424 -883 -108.4 -229.3 584.8 -142.3 460.4
PSE (Rs. bil)
PSEc 35.2 89.4 80.3 90.1 68.9 17.2 104.3 -37.0 22.1 -97.4 -9.7 -341.6 -89.5 268.6 259.0 625.2 360.7 619.8
PSE 42.8 155.3 148.7 132.5 64.9 -60.2 91.5 -257.9 -151.5 -483.2 -281.4 -1144 -586 209.9 128.2 961.8 273.4 905.3
PSE (%)
OECD Denominator
PSEc 4.3 10.4 9.1 9.9 5.9 1.3 6.7 -1.8 0.9 -3.4 -0.3 -10.3 -2.4 6.9 5.5 12.7 7.1 11.0
PSE 5.2 18.1 16.8 14.6 5.5 -4.4 5.9 -12.5 -6.5 -16.8 -9.1 -34.5 -15.5 5.4 2.7 19.5 5.4 16.1
Trade Economist Denominator
PSEc 4.5 11.7 10.0 11.0 6.2 1.3 7.2 -1.8 1.0 -3.3 -0.3 -9.4 -2.3 7.4 5.8 14.5 7.6 12.4
PSE 5.5 22.2 20.2 17.1 5.8 -4.2 6.2 -11.1 -6.1 -14.4 -8.4 -25.7 -13.4 5.7 2.8 24.3 5.7 19.2 
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Table 28—Total PSE Under the Exportables Hypothesis, 1985-2002 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Measured Support (Rs. bil)
MPSc 38.5 88.0 144.0 99.9 32.7 -24.0 66.0 -101.3 -70.6 -215.8 -189.4 -538.3 -324.2 49.0 89.1 502.4 422.1 476.8
BP 29.3 34.7 27.1 50.3 72.6 87.6 117.5 122.6 138.9 157.5 230.4 279.4 296.6 318.4 357.5 377.0 415.7 444.9
C o v e r e d  S h a r e 0 . 4 40 . 4 60 . 4 40 . 4 80 . 4 90 . 4 80 . 5 10 . 4 20 . 4 10 . 4 00 . 4 70 . 4 40 . 4 40 . 4 70 . 4 30 . 4 40 . 4 00 . 3 9
MPS (Rs. bil) 86.8 192.2 324.9 206.1 66.4 -50.0 128.7 -239.5 -174.0 -537.4 -401.1 -1229 -733 104.9 204.8 1147.1 1056.8 1216.7
PSE (Rs. bil)
PSEc 67.8 122.7 171.1 150.2 105.3 63.6 183.5 21.3 68.3 -58.3 41.0 -258.8 -27.7 367.3 446.6 879.4 837.8 921.7
PSE 116.2 226.9 352.0 256.4 139.0 37.7 246.2 -117.0 -35.0 -379.9 -170.7 -949 -436 423.3 562.3 1524.1 1472.5 1661.6
PSE (%)
OECD Denominator
PSEc 8.3 14.3 19.3 16.6 8.9 4.6 11.8 1.0 2.9 -2.0 1.3 -7.8 -0.7 9.4 9.5 17.8 16.4 16.4
PSE 14.2 26.5 39.8 28.3 11.8 2.7 15.8 -5.7 -1.5 -13.2 -5.5 -28.7 -11.6 10.9 11.9 30.9 28.8 29.6
Trade Economist Denominator
PSEc 9.0 16.8 24.1 19.9 9.8 4.9 13.4 1.0 3.0 -2.0 1.4 -7.3 -0.7 10.4 10.5 21.8 19.6 19.6
PSE 16.5 36.1 66.1 39.5 13.4 2.8 18.8 -5.4 -1.5 -11.7 -5.2 -22.3 -10.4 12.2 13.5 44.8 40.5 42.0 
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Table 29—Total PSE Under the Importables Hypothesis, 1985-2002 
 




1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Measured Support (Rs. bil)
MPSc -51.7 -5.8 53.2 5.5 -143.2 -217.4 -153.0 -369.7 -393.1 -584.3 -611.1 -980.9 -839.2 -496.0 -530.7 -192.5 -263.2 -280.4
BP 29.3 34.7 27.1 50.3 72.6 87.6 117.5 122.6 138.9 157.5 230.4 279.4 296.6 318.4 357.5 377.0 415.7 444.9
C o v e r e d  S h a r e 0 . 4 40 . 4 50 . 4 40 . 4 80 . 4 90 . 4 80 . 5 10 . 4 20 . 4 00 . 4 00 . 4 70 . 4 40 . 4 40 . 4 60 . 4 30 . 4 20 . 3 90 . 3 8
MPS (Rs. bil) -118.0 -12.8 121.6 11.4 -293.7 -456.2 -300.4 -881.4 -976.6 -1468.0 -1302.3 -2248 -1919 -1079.9 -1236.1 -453.2 -680.1 -737.4
PSE (Rs. bil)
PSEc -22.4 28.9 80.3 55.9 -70.6 -129.8 -35.4 -247.2 -254.1 -426.8 -380.7 -701.5 -542.6 -177.7 -173.3 184.4 152.5 164.5
PSE -88.6 21.9 148.7 61.8 -221.1 -368.6 -182.9 -758.8 -837.6 -1310.5 -1071.8 -1969 -1622 -761.5 -878.6 -76.3 -264.4 -292.6
PSE (%)
OECD Denominator
PSEc -2.7 3.4 9.1 6.2 -6.0 -9.5 -2.3 -11.9 -10.8 -14.8 -12.3 -21.2 -14.4 -4.6 -3.7 3.7 3.0 2.9
PSE -10.8 2.6 16.8 6.8 -18.8 -26.9 -11.7 -36.7 -35.7 -45.6 -34.8 -59.4 -43.0 -19.5 -18.6 -1.5 -5.2 -5.2
Trade Economist Denominator
PSEc -2.7 3.5 10.0 6.6 -5.7 -8.6 -2.2 -10.7 -9.8 -12.9 -11.0 -17.5 -12.6 -4.4 -3.5 3.9 3.1 3.0
PSE -9.8 2.6 20.2 7.3 -15.8 -21.2 -10.5 -26.8 -26.3 -31.3 -25.8 -37.3 -30.1 -16.3 -15.7 -1.5 -4.9 -4.9 
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Figure 31—Estimates of Total PSE Under the Modified Procedure Without and 




















































































Note: Computed with the OECD denominator. PSEc is without scaling up; PSE is with scaling up  
                        (see text for discussion). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 32—Estimates of Total PSE Under the Exportable Hypothesis Without and 






















































































Note: Computed with the OECD denominator. PSEc is without scaling up; PSE is with scaling up  
          (see text for discussion).  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 33—Estimates of Total PSE Under the Importables Hypothesis Without and 





















































































Note: Computed with the OECD denominator. PSEc is without scaling up; PSE is with scaling up  
          (see text for discussion). 
 





8.     SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this study, we evaluate the protection and support versus disprotection of 
agriculture in India primarily by examining market price support for eleven crops and 
budgetary expenditures on agriculture over 1985-2002. We draw heavily from the 
extensive price-comparison and subsidy-measurement data sets and analysis developed 
earlier by Gulati and his co-authors, often using disaggregated analysis for representative 
surplus and deficit states. This allows us to explore how key adjustments and assumptions 
impact the results. We show for wheat, for example, that ignoring factors such as internal 
transport costs, marketing margins and quality differences in the market price support 
component of the PSE can result in an inaccurate measure, especially when wheat is 
assumed an exportable. We then base our analysis on comparisons of domestic and 
adjusted reference prices that take these costs into account, as developed in the database 
of Gulati and co-authors.  
Using different variants of the PSE, we also extend the earlier analysis to 
demonstrate how several other types of adjustments and assumptions influence the 
calculations. In the OECD approach, for example, the MPS for the covered commodities 
is “scaled up” to all products based on the share of the covered commodities in the total 
value of production. The scaling up procedure leads to a MPS of greater absolute value 
than the MPS for the covered commodities, and can result in PSEs of different sign than 
the non-scaled up version. We also examine two ways in which the percentage PSE can 
be reported, depending on whether the denominator is the value of domestic farm revenue 
or the value of agricultural output at international prices.  
In addition to these adjustments, we also find that the usual procedure of 
computing the MPS based on a comparison of domestic price to an adjusted reference 
price that corresponds to the current direction of net trade can be problematic, especially 
when a country is near self-sufficiency. Since there are many factors influencing the 
current direction of trade, net trade status may not be the best determinant of which  
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adjusted reference price to use. To address the reference price issues, we follow the 
Byerlee and Morris (1993) procedure to compute the level of protection or disprotection 
relative to the relevant adjusted reference price that would exist in the country if the 
policy interventions were removed.  
Overall, our results indicate that support is largely counter-cyclical, rising when 
world prices are low (as in the mid 1980s and 1990s) and falling when world prices are 
high (as in the early 1990s). Our results also demonstrate the increased importance of 
budgetary payments for input subsidies in providing support to agriculture in recent 
years. Yet, in the aggregate for both price support and budgetary expenditures, the 
counter-cyclical dimension of agricultural policy (as opposed to a clear trend from 1985 
through 2002) characterizes our assessment.  
The magnitudes of estimated support for agriculture are also important. We 
replicate the relatively high levels of subsidies reported by other studies as required to 
export wheat and rice from India in some recent years, even when we report a lower level 
of subsidization under our modified procedure. More broadly, we report less 
disprotection of agriculture in India in the 1990s than in earlier studies. Partly this 
difference is explained by differences in the mechanics of our calculations, and partly by 
our application of the modified procedure for choosing reference prices. A large 
component of this difference also rests on whether or not the price support evaluated for 
covered commodities is scaled up to apply to commodities that are not covered.  
There are also fertile areas for future research. Estimates of adjustment costs used 
in domestic-to-border price comparisons, such as transportation and processing costs or 
marketing margins, are crucial variables in the analysis and merit being re-examined and 
further updated. Resolving what are the most reasonable assumptions about reference 
prices, or extending the analysis to additional crops and livestock to reduce uncertainty in 
the analysis will also contribute to fuller understanding of the net stance of policy toward 
agriculture and how it has evolved over time.    
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